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Abstract
In this study we investigate the link between the job search channels that workers use
to find employment and the probability of occupational mismatch in the new job. Our spe-
cific focus is on differences between native and immigrant workers. We use data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) over the period 2000-2014. First, we document that
referral hiring via social networks is the most frequent single channel of generating jobs in
Germany; in relative terms referrals are used more frequently by immigrant workers com-
pared to natives. Second, our data reveals that referral hiring is associated with the highest
rate of occupational mismatch among all channels in Germany. We combine these findings
and use them to develop a theoretical search and matching model with two ethnic groups of
workers (natives and immigrants), two search channels (formal and referral hiring) and two
occupations. When modeling social networks we take into account ethnic and professional
homophily in the link formation. Our model predicts that immigrant workers face stronger
risk of unemployment and often rely on recommendations from their friends and relatives as
a channel of last resort. Furthermore, higher rates of referral hiring produce more frequent
occupational mismatch of the immigrant population compared to natives. We test this pre-
diction empirically and confirm that more intensive network hiring contributes significantly
to higher rates of occupational mismatch among immigrants. Finally, we document that the
gaps in the incidence of referrals and mismatch rates are reduced among second generation
immigrants indicating some degree of integration in the German labour market.
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1 Introduction
In this study we investigate the link between the methods of job search that workers use to find
employment and the probability of occupational mismatch in the new job. According to multiple
empirical studies the most common search methods include private and public employment
agencies, direct applications to job advertisements posted in newspapers and internet as well as
help from friends and relatives. Following the literature we define referral hiring via the network
of friends and relatives as an informal search channel, whereas employment agencies and direct
applications form a formal channel of job search. The primary question that we address in
this study is whether both search channels are equally efficient in generating good matches. By
good matches we mean jobs in the original occupation corresponding to the professional training
and education of the worker. Empirical evidence shows that changing the occupation is often
associated with lower wages and higher job instability1, thus new jobs involving occupational
mismatch can be seen as low quality matches. Moreover, we analyze if the efficiency of the search
channel is the same for different demographic groups, with a particular focus on differences
between native and immigrant workers.
In our empirical estimation we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
over the period 2000-2014. This is a household survey which includes detailed information about
worker characteristics, the job search method which was used to find the job as well as some
characteristics of the employer. The data also includes subjective evaluation of the worker if
the current job corresponds to his/her professional training or not. We use this information to
form a proxy variable for occupational mismatch. In the first step, we document that referral
hiring via social networks is the most frequent single channel of generating jobs in Germany. But
there are large differences in the utilization of this channel between native and foreign workers.
Whereas 31.5% of German workers found their current job by recommendation, this fraction is
43.8% for immigrant workers living in Germany. Note, however, that this difference doesn’t fully
compensate immigrant workers for the lower chances of finding jobs via the formal channel, so
the average risk of unemployment is higher for immigrants. This finding is particularly important
in the view of the result by Bentolila et al. (2010) that referral hiring via social networks often
generates mismatch between occupational choices of workers and their professional training.
Intuitively, this means that social networks often serve as a method of last resort for workers
and allows them to avoid unemployment at the cost of lower wages in the mismatch occupation.
Hence we ask a question whether a more intensive utilization of social networks can lead to more
frequent occupational mismatch of immigrant workers?
To address this question we develop a theoretical search and matching model with two ethnic
groups of workers (natives N and immigrants I), two search channels (formal and referral hiring)
and two occupations. This is a second step in our research. Half of the workers have initial
professional training in occupation A but they can also perform jobs in occupation B, which
is associated with occupational mismatch. The situation is symmetric in the two occupations.
Depending on the ethnic background (N or I) and professional training (A or B) there are four
distinct worker groups in the model. Thus workers in a given group have social links within their
own group but also with workers in the other three groups. When modeling social networks
1Wolbers (2003), Allen and De Weert (2007), Robst (2007)
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we take into account ethnic and professional homophily. Intuitively, this means that foreign
(native) workers have a larger fraction of other foreign (native) workers in their social network.
Following the definition by Jackson (2010) ethnic bias in the formation of social networks can
be characterized as homophily by choice since workers with similar ethnic background have
common language, traditions and history. In contrast, occupational bias in the formation of
social networks is homophily by opportunity since workers from the same profession/occupation
are likely to have studied or worked together in the past.
In our model firms with open positions either make their vacancies public and try to fill the
job in a formal way or contact one of the employees in their occupation and ask this employee
to recommend a friend. In this latter case the position can be filled by referral hiring as work-
ers transmit vacancy information to their unemployed social contacts. Whereas referral hiring
is modeled endogenously, the processes of formal hiring and job destruction are based on the
exogenous transition rates. In the numerical example of the model we choose these transition
rates by targeting some of the key endogenous variables in the model, such as the unemploy-
ment rates and the rates of referral hiring observed in the German data. In order to incorporate
the evidence by Bentolila et al. (2010) we normalize the rate of occupational mismatch gener-
ated by the formal channel to zero and investigate relative differences in the mismatch rates of
native and immigrant workers generated by social networks. Our model predicts that higher
rates of referral hiring among immigrants produce more frequent occupational mismatch of the
immigrant population. One condition for this result is that the gap in the job destruction rates
between native and immigrant workers is not too large which is satisfied for a realistic param-
eter setting motivated by the data. From a theoretical perspective the gap in mismatch rates
strongly depends on the degree of professional homophily characterizing social networks and on
the incidence of referrals but is not sensitive to the overall network size.
In the third step we validate the result by Bentolila et al. (2010) with the German dataset
(SOEP) and test the main prediction of our model. Our data reveals that referral hiring is
associated with the highest rate of occupational mismatch among all channels in Germany. It is
equal to 53.5%, whereas the rate of occupational mismatch associated with direct applications
to a vacancies advertised in internet is equal to 31.4%. Even though these rates are based on
subjective evaluations of workers there is a remarkable difference in the observed frequencies
which confirms the result by Bentolila et al. (2010) and the underlying setup of our theoretical
model. Further, the data shows that immigrant workers have a significantly higher probability
of occupational mismatch (57%) than native workers (42%) which is compatible with the main
prediction of our model. However, it is not only this negative link between being a foreigner
and the probability of a good match that we want to test, but the underlying mechanism of the
model based on the search channel. So we included both binary variables for the immigration
status and for referral hiring as a successful search channel into the logistic panel regression with
a probability of a good match as predicted outcome. Our estimation shows that the negative
marginal effect of the immigration indicator is reduced once we control for the job search channel
which confirms our predictions that at least a part of the higher probability of mismatch in the
group of foreign workers is explained by more frequent referral hiring.
In the last step we quantify the contribution of more intensive network hiring in the group of
foreign workers to higher rates of occupational mismatch in this group. In order to achieve this
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goal we perform a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of differences in the occupational mismatch
between native and foreign workers based on the linear probability model. Differences in the en-
dowments between natives and foreigners including the job search channel jointly explain about
a half of the gap in the mismatch rates between the two groups, that is 7.6% out of 15.5%. Most
of this endowment effect (6.7% out of 7.6%) is explained by the lower education of foreign work-
ers and by the industry effects. Intuitively, this means that foreign workers are overrepresented
in industries with lower education and associated with higher rates of occupational mismatch
such as transportation and trade. Nevertheless, the remaining 0.9% of the endowment effect
is due to the less efficient search channels used by foreign workers. Thus the fact that foreign
workers rely intensively on the support from their social networks contributes significantly to
the higher rate of occupational mismatch of foreigners even though this effect is quantitatively
smaller than the effect of classical explanatory factors such as education and industry.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is closely related to the literature on referral hiring, occupational mismatch and
immigration. Even though bilateral relationships between these three components are reasonably
well investigated, our study is a first theoretical and empirical attempt analyzing an integral
relationship between all three components.
First, we contribute to the literature on referral hiring and match quality. Here a positive
effect of referrals on match quality is highlighted by Montgomery (1991), Kugler (2003), Dust-
mann et al. (2016) and Galenianos (2013). The seminal study by Montgomery (1991) finds that
employers relying on referrals from high ability workers try to mitigate the adverse-selection
problem. Assuming that the current high ability worker will refer to an own type high ability
worker, the workers hired through referrals are paid higher wages. The result is driven by the
fact that social contacts tend to occur among workers with similar characteristics (homophily
by ability), and that a worker will refer only well-qualified applicants, since his/her reputation
is at stake. Whereas, Dustmann et al. (2016) distinguish between informal and formal search
methods and build a model of ethnic networks. They predict that the probability of a minority
worker from a particular ethnic group to be hired is positively related to the share of existing
minority workers from that group in the firm. According to them workers hired through informal
search methods initially get higher wages since the match-specific productivity is more uncertain
when using formal methods, rather than informal methods. Kugler (2003) argues that employers
which use informal methods in hiring are enabled to reduce their monitoring cost, and to pay
lower efficiency wages because referees exert peer pressure on the referred workers. As a result,
well-connected workers are matched to well-paid jobs.
Although most of the studies find that referrals increase the probability for the worker to
be hired, Pistaferri (1999), Addison and Portugal (2002), Bentolila et al. (2010) and Zaharieva
(2018) find negative wage effect of referrals. Our results are inline with the findings highlighted by
Bentolila et al. (2010) for the United States. Even though social contacts reduce unemployment
duration by about 1-3 months, they are associated with wage discounts of at least 2.5% due
to occupational mismatch. This evidence reveals a trade-off from using social contacts in the
job search: even though social contacts lead faster to new jobs and allow workers to leave
unemployment, these jobs are more likely to be associated with occupational mismatch and lower
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wages. Pellizzari (2010) uses data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
and finds that in the European Union premiums and penalties to finding jobs through personal
contacts are equally frequent and are of about the same size. Furthermore, he argues that wage
penalties may be a result of mismatching, since they disappear with tenure. The advantage of
our data compared to Bentolila et al. (2010) and Pellizzari (2010) is that it includes a direct
indicator for occupational mismatch reported by the survey respondents. Furthermore, the goal
of our study is to understand differences between native and immigrant workers in the use of
social contacts and labour market outcomes, which was not done in the previous literature.
The studies by Zaharieva (2018) and Horvath (2014) develop theoretical models to study
labour market outcomes of using social networks. Both studies introduce professional homophily
into social networks which means that workers in a given profession have many friends and
acquaintances from the same profession. Both authors document occupational mismatch being
associated with the use of social networks in the job search. Moreover, the mismatch is decreasing
with an increasing level of professional homophily. This is intuitive since a larger number of social
contacts from the same profession make it more likely that a job referral will lead to a good match
in this profession. Another two studies by Lancee (2016) and Alaverdyan (2018) incorporate
ethnic homophily of social networks in their analysis which means that workers tend to have
more friends of the same ethnic origin. To the best of our knowledge the model developed in the
present paper is the first one that includes both dimensions of network homophily taking into
account ethnic and professional characteristics of workers.
Second, our study is closely related to the literature on referral hiring and immigration.
Immigrants are more likely to find their jobs through referrals compared to natives according
to Drever and Hoffmeister (2008), Lancee (2016), Alaverdyan (2018). Other studies consider
subgroups of immigrants from different countries of origin. For example, Ooka and Wellman
(2006) investigate the importance of social networks in relation to the job search strategies of
five immigrant groups living in Toronto. They find that Jewish immigrants have the highest rate
of using personal contacts when searching for jobs (54%) followed by Italians (51%), Germans
(45%), British (44%) and Ukrainians (40%). Elliot (2001) considers recent Latino immigrants to
the United States. He finds that 81.1% of recent immigrants from this group were hired through
the informal channel. The fraction is somewhat smaller for established immigrants (more than 5
years since arrival to the US) and equal to 72.8%. It falls down to 61.9% for Latino individuals
born in the US. For comparison, the fraction of native US nationals finding jobs via the informal
channel is 51.1%. These results indicate that referral hiring is a particularly important job
search channel for recent immigrants in the United States but its importance declines with time
as immigrant workers learn the local language and assimilate in the destination country.
Battu et al. (2011) find a similar assimilation effect of immigrant workers in the United
Kingdom. They provide evidence that the less assimilated the ethnic unemployed workers are
the more likely they are to use their network as their main method of job search. Moreover, they
report that ethnic workers who obtained their current job as a result of their personal network
are in a lower level job as a result. Again this indicates the fact that faster accession to jobs
provided by social networks comes along with a wage penalty and worse job quality emphasized
above. We complement this research direction by documenting that also in Germany the highest
incidence of referrals is observed in the group of direct (first generation) immigrants (41.9%),
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followed by the indirect (second generation) immigrants (35.6%) and German nationals (30.3%).
Moreover, we link these differences to the match quality of obtained jobs.
Third, we contribute to the debate on immigration and occupational mismatch. There
is a vast literature on occupational mismatch distinguishing between vertical and horizontal
mismatch. Vertical mismatch is observed when the worker is over- or underqualified for the
occupation employed. While horizontal mismatch applies to the situation when the field of
education of the worker does not correspond to the education required for the job (see Wolbers
(2003), Allen and De Weert (2007) and Robst (2007)). Wolbers (2003) considers data on school
graduates in Western European economies and finds that school-leavers from humanities, arts
and agriculture are more likely to be mismatched than those from engineering, manufacturing,
business and law. Robst (2007) finds similar results for college graduates in the United States
and shows that 27-47% of workers in arts, social sciences, psychology, languages and biology are
mismatched. He also reports that horizontal mismatch is associated with a wage loss of 10%.
More recent studies in this field compare the outcomes of native and immigrant workers. For
example, Chiswick and Miller (2008) and Chiswick and Miller (2010) report lower returns to
schooling for foreign-born workers compared to natives in the U.S. and Australia respectively
and explain this outcome with low international transferability of immigrant’s human capital
skills implying more frequent skill mismatch of foreign-born workers. Aleksynska and Tritah
(2013) consider a large set of European countries and find that immigrants are more likely to
be both under- and overeducated than the native born for the jobs that they perform. How-
ever, immigrants outcomes converge to those of the native born with the years of labor market
experience. In our data we also observe this type of integration in the German labour market.
Piracha and Vadean (2013) present an overview of this literature and show that the percentage
of correctly matched immigrant employees is, for example, about 5.0% lower compared to native
employees in Denmark and reaches up to 15.6% in the United States. The only exceptions are
Finland and Italy, where the mismatch incidence seems to be higher for natives. They also
point out that different measurement methods often lead to significantly different estimates of
incidence rates. In particular, mismatch is more frequent when self-reported rather than when
objective measures are used. Our empirical estimates for Germany are similar to the U.S. with
the percentage of correctly matched immigrant employees 15.5% lower compared to natives. We
contribute to this literature by explicitly comparing job search channels of workers and mismatch
outcomes associated with these channels which was not done before. Moreover, we show that
referral hiring generates occupational mismatch more frequently than other search strategies
and it is this channel which is more often used by immigrant workers contributing to stronger
occupational mismatch of this group.
Finally, there are several additional results that we obtain from the data. In particular, we
document that educated workers are substantially less likely to use social contacts as intermedi-
aries in the job search. Male workers are referred more often by their social contacts than female
workers. This finding is generally consistent with the idea that women lack professional networks
compared to men. It is also supported by the previous empirical research for the United States
summarized in Marsden and Gorman (2001) and by Behtoui (2008) for women in Sweden. In
addition, jobs in smaller companies are more frequently filled via social networks. This result is
inline with the recent evidence in Rebien et al. (2017) using German firm-level data.
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The study proceeds as follows: in section 2 we describe the data and estimate regressions
for the probability of finding a job via referrals. We use this empirical evidence to motivate our
theoretical model which is developed and described in section 3. In section 4 we use empirical
data to test new theoretical predictions of the model. More specifically, in this section we carry
out the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of differences in the occupational mismatch rates between
native and foreign workers. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section we describe our empirical data and analyze which factors can explain the risk
of unemployment. We also explore the search channels used by workers to find employment.
We use this empirical evidence to build up a job search model with two ethnic worker groups,
two professional occupations and two different search channels: direct formal applications and
referral hiring via social networks. The model is developed and presented in section 3. We also
use predicted values of the key variables from this section to provide a realistic numerical example
allowing us to illustrate the underlying economic mechanism of the model. In particular, we use
the estimated unemployment rates and the fractions of workers who found their job through
referrals by citizenship and migration background.
2.1 Estimation of unemployment rates
In this subsection we estimate unemployment rates for different worker groups by using em-
pirical data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). SOEP is a longitudinal study of
households and individuals, which covers nearly 11,000 households, and about 30,000 individ-
uals annually. Our sample covers data on 213592 individuals from SOEP 2000-2014. Among
a wide range of questions regarding personal characteristics and employment data respondents
are asked about their employment status and labour force status. The dependent variable
EMPi,t is binary, and takes values {0, 1} based on the answers to the above-mentioned ques-
tions. EMPi,t equals 1 if individual i is in full-time employment, marginal, regular or irregular
part-time employment at time t. While EMPi,t equals 0 if individual i is non-working and
registered unemployed at time t. Disabled individuals in sheltered employment, the individuals
in military/community service, on maternity leave and in training program are excluded from
the data. In addition, we exclude those non-working individuals which are older than 65, which
are working past 7 days, those which have regular second job or occasional second job.
MIGi,t is a variable indicating the nationality of individuals. We define an individual to
be foreign citizen if the person has foreign citizenship, and German citizen if the person has
German citizenship. So, variable MIGi,t equals 1 if the i
th individual is a foreign citizen at
time t, and it is equal to 0 if the ith individual is a German citizen at time t. Additionally,
MIGBACKi,t indicates the migration background of individuals based on their place of birth.
If the respondent is born in another country, then the respondent is considered to have a direct
migration background. If the respondent is born in Germany, but one of the respondent’s parents
has a migration background, then the respondent is considered to have an indirect migration
background. While when there is no information about the respondent’s migration background,
then the respondent is classified as a German national.
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Table 1: Percentage of unemployed individuals by citizenship\migration background.
Citizenship\
Unemployed(%) Unemployed Employed Total Total(%)
Migration background
Foreign Citizens 14.81% 2569 14772 17341 8.12%
German Citizens 7.86% 15421 180830 196251 91.88%
Direct migrants 13.30% 3784 24677 28461 13.32%
Indirect migrants 10.04% 1221 10941 12162 5.69%
German nationals 7.51% 12985 159984 172969 80.98%
According to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1, 14.81% of foreign citizens are
unemployed, compared to 7.86% for German citizens. While, 13.30% of direct migrants, 10.04%
of indirect migrants, and 7.51% of German nationals are unemployed. So, the difference in
unemployment rates between direct migrants and German nationals is higher than the difference
between indirect migrants and German nationals. This might possibly be explained by partial
assimilation of indirect migrants and better language skills, compared to direct migrants.
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 show that foreign citizens are more likely
to be unemployed, but the reason may be due to different characteristics of the groups. To
control for differences in the observable characteristics we regress EMPi,t on different variables
sequentially adding the following variables to the regression equation. EDUi,t shows the amount
of the ith individual’s education or training in years at time t computed by the SOEP.2 The
values of EDUi,t range from 7 to 18. The i
th individual’s age at time t is denoted by AGEi,t.
The dummy variable FEMALEi,t takes value 1 if the i
th individual is female at time t. The
categorical variable MARSTi,t shows the marital status of the i
th individual at time t. It has
5 categories: married/living with a partner, single, widowed, divorced, and separated (legally
married). Another categorical variable STATEi,t indicates the German federal state in which the
household of the ith individual was located at the time of the survey. And finally, NCHILDi,t
shows the number of persons in the household of the ith individual under the age of 18 at
time t. When the dependent variable is binary this study uses logistic regression model for
estimations, and likelihood-ratio test to choose between regression equations. After adding each
variable to the regression equation a likelihood-ratio test is conducted to see if the variable
added contributes statistically significantly to the regression. The main estimation results of
the regression equations are presented in Table 2. The detailed estimation results with the
coefficients of all variables are presented in Table 13 in Appendix I.
Table 2: Employment rates: logistic regression
Variables Dependent variable: EMP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EDU 0.315∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(76.14) (76.09) (76.17) (76.99) (80.91) (80.81) (80.55) (75.31)
AGE 0.00225∗∗ 0.00225∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.00943∗∗∗ -0.00971∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗
(3.24) (3.25) (-13.46) (-11.28) (-11.56) (-18.52) (-20.06)
FEMALE -0.138∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(-8.71) (-6.59) (-6.86) (-6.98) (-7.37) (-8.09)
Continued on next page
2for detailed description see Helberger (1988) and Schwarze et al. (1991)
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Variables Dependent variable: EMP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MARST(Reference: Married)
[2] Single -0.867∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗ -0.774∗∗∗ -0.957∗∗∗ -1.003∗∗∗
(-39.95) (-34.43) (-34.54) (-39.67) (-41.38)
[3] Widowed -0.323∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
(-5.60) (-5.15) (-5.12) (-5.93) (-6.33)
[4] Divorced -0.770∗∗∗ -0.743∗∗∗ -0.747∗∗∗ -0.807∗∗∗ -0.839∗∗∗
(-32.41) (-30.85) (-30.94) (-33.04) (-34.18)
[5] Separated -0.752∗∗∗ -0.748∗∗∗ -0.748∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗ -0.815∗∗∗
(-16.98) (-16.62) (-16.60) (-17.70) (-17.94)
NCHILD -0.175∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(-20.25) (-19.22)
MIG -0.652∗∗∗
(-24.68)
STATE v v v v
Survey year t v v v
Constant -1.311∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗∗ -1.349∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -1.115∗∗∗ -1.050∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.125
(-28.11) (-25.53) (-24.25) (-9.04) (-14.31) (-12.72) (-6.01) (-1.42)
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.0012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 213592 213592 213592 213592 213592 213592 213592 213592
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.081 0.116 0.117 0.120 0.125
Standard errors are in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2 reveals that education is positively associated with the employment probability. Also
married workers are more likely to be employed. In contrast, being a female reduces the prob-
ability of employment. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of variable MIGi,t
indicates that foreign citizens are less likely to be employed. The predicted probabilities of being
employed for two otherwise-average individuals’ are 94.84% for German citizens, and 90.55% for
foreign citizens. So the risk of unemployment is 5.16% for the first group and 9.45% for the sec-
ond group. We use these predicted values of the unemployment rates in the numerical example
of the model in section 3. The results of the likelihood-ratio tests suggest that all the above-
mentioned variables should be added to the regression equation. When variable MIGBACKi,t
is added to the regression equation instead of MIGi,t, the qualitative result doesn’t change
3.
The predicted probabilities of being employed for otherwise-average individuals’ from the three
groups are the following: 95.27% for German nationals, 92.37% for indirect migrants and 90.53%
for direct migrants. The predicted probability of being employed for indirect migrants is closer
to the probability for German nationals, compared to direct migrants, which indicates some de-
gree of assimilation. Note that in all regressions the predicted probabilities are estimated at the
average values of control variables. Next we analyze the incidence of different search channels
used by workers to find employment with a particular focus on referral hiring.
2.2 Estimation of referral hiring
The respondents of the SOEP survey who started their current job within the previous two
years answer the question how they found their current job. One of the possible answers is that
information about the job was provided by friends or relatives of the respondent. We classify
these cases as referral hiring (informal channel). Other search channels such as the federal
3The coefficients for this regression are available on demand from the authors.
9
employment office, an advertisement in the internet or newspaper, a job-center (ARGE) and
a private recruitment agency are classified as formal channels. The value of the corresponding
dummy variable REFi,t equals 1 if the i
th individual found the job via a referral from some
friend or relative, and it equals 0 if the ith individual used a formal channel to find the job.
Table 3: Percentage of individuals who found their job through referrals by citizenship\migration
background.
Citizenship\ Found job through Found job through
Total Total(%)
Migration background referrals(%) Referrals Formal chan.
Foreign Citizens 43.84% 648 830 1478 7.72%
German Citizens 31.48% 5562 12108 17670 92.28%
Direct migrants 41.91% 873 1210 2083 10.88%
Indirect migrants 35.58% 528 956 1484 7.75%
German nationals 30.86% 4809 10772 15581 81.37%
According to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 3, 43.84% of foreign citizens found
their job through referrals, compared to 31.48% for German citizens. Following a different defi-
nition 41.91% of direct migrants, 35.58% of indirect migrants, and 30.86% of German nationals
obtained help from their friends and relatives. So, the difference in the proportion of individuals
who found their job through referrals between indirect migrants and German nationals is lower
than the difference between direct migrants and German nationals.
In the next step REFi,t is regressed on a set of control variables to test if the differences
in referral hiring are due to the different characteristics of the two groups. In addition to vari-
ables indicating the individuals’ education, age, gender, state of residence, and survey year the
following variables are sequentially added to the regression equation. FSIZEi,t is a categorical
variable with four categories showing the size of the firm in which the ith individual is employed
at time t. The categories are: less than 20 employees, 20 to 200, 200 to 2000, and more than
2000 employees. Another categorical variable INDi,t indicates the industry of i
th individual at
time t. INDi,t has 9 categories: Agriculture, Energy, Mining, Manufacturing, Construction,
Trade, Transport, Bank/Insurance, and Services. The categorical variable TOJCHi,t has 5 cat-
egories and indicates which kind of job change preceded the current employment of individual
i. The categories of TOJCHi,t are the following: first job, job after break, job with new em-
ployer, company taken over, changed job at the same firm. Last, the Standard International
Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status developed by Ganzeboom et al. (1992) is used to
control for the occupational status. ISEI index reflects individual’s socio-economic status based
on information about this individual’s income, education, and occupation. ISEIi,t index takes
values in the range between 16 and 90.
To see if the independent variable contributes significantly to the regression a likelihood-ratio
test was conducted for all new control variables. The main estimation results are presented in
Table 4. While the detailed estimation results with the coefficients of all variables are presented
in Table 14 in Appendix II.
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Table 4: Estimation results of referral hiring.
Variables Dependent variable: REF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EDU -0.106∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.0988∗∗∗ -0.0798∗∗∗ -0.0707∗∗∗ -0.0641∗∗∗ -0.0643∗∗∗ -0.0649∗∗∗ -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0290∗∗∗
(-17.48) (-17.33) (-16.05) (-12.68) (-10.80) (-9.67) (-9.62) (-9.75) (-3.63) (-3.62)
AGE -0.00291∗ -0.00287∗ -0.00436∗∗ -0.00414∗∗ -0.00271 -0.00267 -0.00233 -0.00296 -0.00297
(-2.11) (-2.08) (-3.13) (-2.97) (-1.74) (-1.72) (-1.48) (-1.88) (-1.89)
MIG 0.374∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗
(6.67) (6.60) (6.38) (6.06) (5.78) (6.00) (5.77) (5.68)
FSIZE(Reference: GE 2000)
[1] LT 20 0.719∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(15.07) (14.67) (10.38) (10.37) (10.19) (9.01) (9.07)
[2] GE 20 LT 200 0.385∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.149∗∗
(7.82) (7.62) (3.84) (3.88) (3.65) (2.90) (2.88)
[3] GE 200 LT 2000 0.149∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.0410 0.0418 0.0352 0.0210 0.0190
(2.67) (2.89) (0.71) (0.73) (0.61) (0.36) (0.33)
IND v v v v v v
TOJCH(Reference: First job)
Job After Break -0.278∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
(-4.67) (-4.66) (-5.29) (-5.73) (-5.61)
Job With New Employer 0.129∗ 0.128∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.136∗ 0.135∗
(2.39) (2.37) (2.73) (2.49) (2.48)
Company Taken Over -1.527∗∗∗ -1.526∗∗∗ -1.529∗∗∗ -1.550∗∗∗ -1.555∗∗∗
(-10.17) (-10.16) (-10.17) (-10.30) (-10.33)
Changed Job, Same Firm -1.671∗∗∗ -1.672∗∗∗ -1.680∗∗∗ -1.669∗∗∗ -1.670∗∗∗
(-15.09) (-15.09) (-15.15) (-15.04) (-15.05)
STATE v
Survey year t v v v
ISEI -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗
(-7.94) (-7.99)
FEMALE -0.0745∗
(-2.10)
Constant 0.580∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ -0.0279 -0.215∗ -0.0652 -0.0266 -0.0602 0.0143 0.0662
(7.64) (7.69) (6.26) (-0.28) (-1.97) (-0.58) (-0.18) (-0.50) (0.12) (0.53)
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.0344 0.00 0.0275 0.00 0.00 0.5708 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.028 0.030 0.058 0.058 0.060 0.062 0.062
Standard errors are in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4 shows that referral hiring is more important for less educated workers and it is more
widespread in smaller firms. First employment and jobs with new employers are more likely
to be generated by means of referral hiring. Moreover, the negative coefficient of the dummy
variable FEMALEi,t indicates that female workers are less likely to be hired through referrals
than male workers. The results of likelihood-ratio tests suggest that except STATEi,t all the
above-mentioned variables should be added to the regression equation.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of variable MIGi,t indicates that foreign
citizens are more likely to find their jobs through referrals. The predicted probabilities of finding
a job through referral for two otherwise-average individuals’ are 29.72% for German citizens, and
36.96% for foreign citizens. We use these values in the numerical example of the model in section
3. When variableMIGBACKi,t is added to the regression equation instead ofMIGi,t predicted
probabilities of finding a job through referrals for otherwise-average individuals’ from the three
groups are the following: 29.26% for German nationals, 36.47% for direct migrants, and 32.36%
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for indirect migrants4. Thus, the predicted probability of finding a job through referrals for
indirect migrants is closer to the probability for German nationals, compared to direct migrants.
In the next step we use this empirical evidence to develop a theoretical search and matching
model capturing differences in the unemployment rates and job search strategies of native and
foreign workers. We use this model to address a question if differences in the search strategies
may contribute to differences in the match qualities between the two groups.
3 The Model
In this section we develop a search and matching model with two occupations, two search chan-
nels (formal search and network referrals) and two ethnic worker groups (natives and foreigners).
The model incorporates the fact that foreign workers rely more often on their social networks
when searching for jobs which was documented in the previous section. It also allows for dif-
ferent unemployment rates of the two ethnic worker groups. The objective of developing this
model is to analyze the impact of referral hiring on occupational mismatch of native and foreign
workers. In addition, we use the model to understand the implications of other factors such as
network characteristics and labour market properties for the link between network hiring and
occupational mismatch.
Consider a model with two professional groups of infinitely lived risk neutral workers and
two occupations. Workers of type A obtained training in occupation A, which is their primary
occupation, but they can also work in occupation B, which is a mismatch occupation for them.
In a similar way, occupation B is a primary occupation for type B workers, whereas there is
mismatch if type B workers are employed in occupation A. Each group of workers is a continuum
of measure 1. In each professional group there is a fraction h of foreign workers F and a fraction
1 − h of native workers N . Hence there are four demographic groups in the economy {N,A},
{F,A}, {N,B} and {F,B}.
Consider native type i individuals, i = A,B. Each person can be unemployed (uiN ), employed
and well matched in the original occupation (miN ) or mismatched and employed in another
occupation (xiN ). The same holds for foreign type i individuals with corresponding notation u
i
F ,
miF and x
i
F , so we get:
uiN +m
i
N + x
i
N = 1− h u
i
F +m
i
F + x
i
F = h
In addition, let eij , i = A,B and j = N,F denote all employed workers of type j and profession
i, both matched and mismatched, that is:
eiN = m
i
N + x
i
N e
i
F = m
i
F + x
i
F
Let vA and vB denote exogenous stocks of open vacancies in occupations A and B respectively.
There are two channels of job search: formal applications and referrals via the social network
(informal channel). Only unemployed workers are searching for a job, so there is no on-the-job
search. We follow the assumption of Bentolila et al. (2010) and assume that workers always send
their formal applications to vacancies in their original occupation. This assumption is based on
4The coefficients for this regression are available on demand from the authors.
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the empirical evidence that social networks generate occupational mismatch more frequently
than formal search. We verify this assumption for Germany in section 4. Even though in reality
formal applications can also lead to mismatch, we normalize it to zero to investigate the relative
difference in mismatch rates generated by the two search channels.
To simplify the model occupations A and B are assumed to be symmetric. Let λN and λF
denote the job-finding rates of native and foreign workers via the formal channel in each of the
two occupations. Variables δN and δF denote the job destruction rates of native and foreign
workers in each of the two occupations. These rates do not depend on the way the worker found
the job and do not depend on the occupation. Nevertheless, we allow for possible differences in
the job stability of native and foreign workers. Since the focus of our study is on referral hiring
we assume that the rates λN , λF , δN and δF are exogenously given. To model referral hiring
let n denote the number of social contacts in the networks of workers. We assume that the
network size n is the same for all individuals. Furthermore, social networks exhibit professional
and ethnic homophily. A more detailed composition of social networks is described in the next
subsection.
3.1 Social networks
Consider a native type A individual. This person has some social contacts within his/her group,
let their number be denoted by nAANN . In addition, this person knows some foreign workers from
the same occupation, let their number be denoted by nAANF . In the same way there are some links
between this person and individuals in occupation B, let them be denoted by nABNN and n
AB
NF .
Here the former number stands for the links to native type B workers and the latter number for
the links to foreign type B workers. So in general every native person of type A has contacts
within each of the four demographic groups. Given that the total number of contacts for one
person is denoted by n we get:
nAANN + n
AA
NF + n
AB
NN + n
AB
NF = n
The composition of social networks is illustrated on figure 1. Next consider foreign type A
workers. Their contacts within the group are denoted by nAAFF and their contacts with native
type A workers are denoted by nAAFN . Variables n
AB
FN and n
AB
FF stand for the links to native and
foreign workers in occupation B respectively, so we get:
nAAFN + n
AA
FF + n
AB
FN + n
AB
FF = n
Social networks exhibit professional and ethnic homophily. In general, homophily refers to
the fact that people are more prone to maintain relationships with others who are similar to
themselves. There can be homophily by age, race, gender, religion, ethnicity or professional
occupation and it is generally a robust observation in social networks (see McPherson et al.
(2001) for an overview of research on homophily). The focus of this paper is on the latter
two types of homophily by ethnicity and occupation. Jackson (2010) distinguishes between
homophily due to opportunity and due to choice. In this respect, homophily by occupation is
likely to arise due to the fact that workers with the same profession studied or worked together
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nAANN n
BB
NN
nBBFFn
AA
FF
nABNN
nBANN
nBBFNn
BB
NF
nABFF
nBAFF
nAAFNn
AA
NF
n
A
B
F
N
n
B
A
N
F
n A
BN
F
n B
AF
N
Figure 1: Composition of social networks
in the beginning of their career. Thus it is rather a limited opportunity of meeting workers
from different professions which generates homophily rather than an explicit choice. In contrast,
homophily by ethnicity is likely to be a choice outcome since workers with similar ethnicity/origin
share common background, values and traditions which makes their communication easier.
Let γ ∈ [0.5..1] denote the degree of professional homophily, identical for all workers. This
means that every worker has a fraction γ of contacts in the same occupation and a fraction 1−γ
of contacts in the other occupation. This means:
nAANN + n
AA
NF = γn n
AA
FN + n
AA
FF = γn
In the extreme case when γ = 1 workers in different occupations are completely disconnected.
The opposite case γ = 0.5 corresponds to random matching without homophily. This is due to
the fact that both professional groups A and B are equally large.
In addition, social networks are characterized by ethnic homophily, let τ ≥ h denote the
fraction of foreign individuals in the network of a foreign person. So we get:
nAAFN = (1− τ)γn n
AA
FF = τγn n
AB
FN = (1− τ)(1− γ)n n
AB
FF = τ(1− γ)n
This is the network composition of foreign type A workers parametrized by γ and τ . Furthermore,
social networks should be balanced. The total number of links from native individuals of type A
to foreigners of type A given by (1−h)nAANF should be the same as the total number of links from
foreign individuals of type A to natives of type A given by hnAAFN . Moreover, the total number
of links from native individuals of type B to foreign individuals of type A, that is (1 − h)nBANF ,
should be the same as the number of links from foreign individuals of type A to native individuals
of type B given by hnABFN . This means:
(1− h)nAANF = hn
AA
FN (1− h)n
BA
NF = hn
AB
FN
14
Inserting nAAFN = (1− τ)γn and n
AB
FN = (1− τ)(1− γ)n we get:
nAANF =
h(1−τ)γn
1−h n
AA
NN =
(1− 2h+ hτ)γn
1− h
nBANF =
h(1−τ)(1−γ)n
1−h n
BA
NN =
(1− 2h+ hτ)(1− γ)n
1− h
This is a consistent network composition of native type A workers parametrized by γ and τ .
To obtain the last equation we used the fact that the two occupations are symmetric and
nBANN + n
BA
NF = (1 − γ)n. These equations show that if τ ≥ h, that is the fraction of foreign
contacts in the networks of foreigners τ is larger than their population fraction h, then it also
holds that the fraction of native contacts in the networks of natives (1 − 2h + hτ)/(1 − h) is
larger than their population fraction 1− h because (1− 2h+ hτ)/(1− h) > 1− h. Thus ethnic
homophily should be seen as a two-sided process.
Note an important special case when τ = h. This is a situation when foreign and native
workers are randomly mixed and create links with each other. So there is no ethnic homophily
and both groups have a fraction h of foreigners in their networks (nAANF = n
AA
FF = hγn) and a
fraction 1− h of natives (nAANN = n
AA
FN = (1− h)γn).
Further, symmetry between the two occupations implies the same composition of social
networks for type B workers, so that nBBFN = n
AA
FN , n
BB
FF = n
AA
FF , n
BA
FN = n
AB
FN , n
BA
FF = n
AB
FF and
nBBNN = n
AA
NN , n
BB
NF = n
AA
NF , n
BA
NN = n
AB
NN , n
BA
NF = n
AB
NF . In order to illustrate the composition of
social networks in our model we complement this subsection with a small example.
Example of network composition: Let γ = τ = 0.6, n = 50 and h = 0.2. This means that
the fraction of foreign workers in the economy is 20%. Then we get the following composition
of networks:
nAAFN = 12 n
AA
FF = 18 n
AB
FN = 8 n
AB
FF = 12
nAANF = 3 n
AA
NN = 27 n
AB
NF = 2 n
AB
NN = 18
Both foreign and native workers know 30 contacts in their own occupation and 20 contacts in
the other occupation. This is because γ = 30/50 = 0.6. But the ethnic composition of social
networks is very different. Whereas the networks of native workers are very extreme with only
3 links to foreign workers and 27 links to other native workers in their occupation, the networks
of foreign workers are more equal with 12 links to native workers and 18 links to other foreign
workers in the same occupation. The reason for this effect is twofold. On the one hand, foreign
workers are a minority in the labour market which implies that native workers are much less
likely to meet a foreigner and create a contact than the other way round. Even if matching
was balanced with respect to ethnic belonging we would expect that native workers know only
0.2 · 30 = 6 foreign workers and 24 other natives in their occupation. On the other hand, the
distribution becomes even more extreme with ethnic homophily, since τ = 0.6.
As we emphasized in the introduction, there are many empirical studies showing that referrals
from social contacts are important in the job search process. Our example reveals that the
situation of native and foreign workers is asymmetric in this respect. Whereas foreign workers
are likely to receive important vacancy information from their native and foreign friends, foreign
contacts are unlikely to be an important source of job-related information for native workers. In
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the next subsection we analyze more specifically how vacancy information is transmitted in the
market and derive referral probabilities for all demographic groups.
3.2 Transition rates
In this subsection we derive endogenous network transition rates from unemployment to jobs
for all worker groups. Recall that λN and λF are the exogenous job-finding rates via the formal
channel. By assumption formal applications always lead to jobs in the original occupation. In
contrast, network referrals can lead to both types of jobs in the original occupation and in the
mismatch occupation. Let µAAN and µ
AA
F denote the network job-finding rates of native and
foreign workers of type A in occupation A respectively. In addition, let µABN and µ
AB
F denote
network job-finding rates leading to mismatch jobs in occupation B. The structure of worker
flows and the corresponding job-finding rates are presented on figure 2. The network job-finding
rates are illustrated by the dashed arrows.
uAN u
B
N
uBFu
A
F
µBANµ
AB
N
vB
λN
µAAF µ
BB
F
λN
vA
µBBN
λF λF
µAAN
µABF µ
BA
F
Figure 2: Structure of the labour market
Consider vacancies in occupation A. With an exogenous probability s firms with open vacan-
cies in this occupation contact one of the incumbent type A employees and ask this employee to
recommend a friend for the open position. It is intuitive to think that firms only ask those em-
ployees who are properly matched to the job, these are workers mAN and m
A
F . So with probability
mAj /(m
A
N +m
A
F ) the firm contacts the employee with ethnic origin j = N,F .
Further we assume that every contacted type A employee is first considering his/her unem-
ployed friends of the same type. Only if all type A friends are employed the person considers
unemployed contacts of type B. Some rationale for this assumption could be that well matched
type A workers in occupation A are more productive than mismatched type B workers. Among
type A contacts the person has nAAjN native friends and n
AA
jF foreign friends. So with probability
[eAN/(1−h)]
nAAjN all native friends of this employee are employed and with probability [eAF /h]
nAAjF all
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foreign friends of this employee are also employed. This means that 1−[eAN/(1−h)]
nAAjN [eAAF /h]
nAAjF
is a probability that this employee can recommend at least one unemployed friend searching for
the job. So the number of network matches between type A vacancies and type A native workers
recommended by the employee j = N,F is:
MAAjN = sv
A
mAj
mAN +m
A
F
(
1−
[ eAN
1− h
]nAAjN [eAF
h
]nAAjF ) nAAjN · uAN1−h
nAAjN ·
uA
N
1−h + n
AA
jF ·
uA
F
h
where the last term is a probability that a randomly chosen unemployed type A friend of the
employee is native. In the special case without ethnic homophily (τ = h) we get nAAjN = (1−h)γn
and nAAjF = hγn, j = N,F . So the above expression can be simplified as:
MAAjN = sv
A
mAj
mAN +m
A
F
(
1−
[ eAN
1− h
](1−h)γn[eAF
h
]hγn) uAN
uAN + u
A
F
In a similar way, the number of network matches between type A vacancies and type A foreign
workers recommended by the employee j = N,F is given by:
MAAjF = svA
mAj
mAN +m
A
F
(
1−
[ eAN
1− h
]nAAjN [eAF
h
]nAAjF ) nAAjF · uAFh
nAAjN ·
uA
N
1−h + n
AA
jF ·
uA
F
h
where the last term is a probability that a randomly chosen unemployed type A friend of employee
j is a foreigner. We can see that the total number of good matches between type A vacancies
and type A unemployed native workers per unit time is given by MAANN +M
AA
FN . In addition,
the total number of good matches between type A vacancies and type A unemployed foreign
workers per unit time is MAANF +M
AA
FF . Given that the stocks of searching unemployed native
and foreign workers are uAN and u
A
F the network transition rates into the original occupation for
native and foreign workers can be calculated as:
µAAN =
MAANN +M
AA
FN
uAN
µAAF =
MAANF +M
AA
FF
uAF
That is the flow probability of finding a job by recommendation in the primary occupation is
given by the ratio between the total number of good matches in this occupation and the total
number of searching workers separately for each ethnic group. Here we account for all possible
situations including cases when native workers are recommended by their foreign friends and
vice verse. Lemma 1 presents our results for the special case when τ = h.
Lemma 1: Network transition rates within the original occupation are the same for native
and foreign workers in the absence of ethnic homophily (τ = h), that is µAA ≡ µAAN =µ
AA
F and:
µAA =
svA
uAN + u
A
F
(
1−
[ eAN
1− h
](1−h)γn[eAF
h
]hγn)
The same is true in occupation B, that is µBBN = µ
BB
F .
Proof: Appendix.
In the special case when social networks do not exhibit ethnic homophily and τ = h the
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composition of networks is the same among native and foreign workers. This means that both
groups have a fraction h of foreigners and a fraction 1 − h of natives among their occupation-
specific contacts. So the probability of hearing about a job via the network in their primary
occupation is the same for both groups.
Next consider occupation B. With the same probability s firms with open vacancies vB ask
one of the incumbent type B employees to recommend a friend. Recall that workers of type B
have native (nBBjN ) and foreign friends (n
BB
jF ) in their occupation. This gives rise to matchesM
BB
jN
and MBBjF in a similar way as above. However, with probability [e
B
N/(1 − h)]
nBBjN [eBF /h]
nBBjF the
employee doesn’t have any unemployed type B friends. Recall that this employee also has native
(nBAjN ) and foreign friends (n
BA
jF ) in occupation A. So the employee is considering unemployed
type A friends. With probability (1 − [eAN/(1 − h)]
nBAjN [eAF /h]
nBAjF ) the employee knows at least
one unemployed type A person who is searching for a job, so a new match is created. Let MABjN
denote the number of matches between type A native workers recommended by their type B
friends with ethnic origin j = F,N :
MABjN =
svB ·m
B
j
mBN +m
B
F︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
[ eBN
1− h
]nBBjN [eBF
h
]nBBjF
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
(
1−
[ eAN
1− h
]nBAjN [eAF
h
]nBAjF )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
nBAjN ·
uAN
1−h
nBAjN ·
uA
N
1−h + n
BA
jF ·
uA
F
h︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)
Here the first term is the probability that the firm is asking a type B employee with ethnic
origin j = N,F to recommend a friend. The second term corresponds to the probability that
this employee doesn’t have any unemployed type B friends. The third term is the probability
that this employee knows at least one unemployed type A friend. And finally the last term is
the probability that a randomly chosen unemployed type A friend of the employee is native.
In the special case without ethnic homophily (τ = h) we know that nBAjN = (1 − h)(1 − γ)n
and nBAjF = h(1− γ)n. So the above expression can be written as:
MABjN =
svB ·m
B
j
mBN +m
B
F
[ eBN
1− h
](1−h)γn[eBF
h
]hγn(
1−
[ eAN
1− h
](1−h)(1−γ)n[eAF
h
]h(1−γ)n) uAN
uAN + u
A
F
Finally, the number of network matches between type B vacancies and type A foreign workers
recommended by the employee j = N,F is:
MABjF =
svB ·m
B
j
mBN +m
B
F
[ eBN
1− h
]nBBjN [eBF
h
]nBBjF (
1−
[ eAN
1− h
]nBAjN [eAF
h
]nBAjF ) nBAjF · uAFh
nBAjN ·
uA
N
1−h + n
BA
jF ·
uA
F
h
where the last term is the probability that a randomly chosen unemployed type A friend of
employee B is a foreigner. Given the number of matches, the network transition rates into the
mismatch occupation for native and foreign workers are given by:
µABN =
MABNN +M
AB
FN
uAN
µABF =
MABNF +M
AB
FF
uAF
Note here that both native and foreign social contacts can potentially lead to the mismatch
job. Transition rates for type B workers µBBN , µ
BB
F , µ
BA
N and µ
BA
F can be found symmetrically.
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Lemma 2 provides a summary of our results on the mismatch transition rates in the special case
when τ = h.
Lemma 2: Network transition rates to the mismatch occupation are the same for native and
foreign workers in the absence of ethnic homophily (τ = h), that is µAB ≡ µABN =µ
AB
F and:
µAB =
svB
uAN + u
A
F
[ eBN
1− h
](1−h)γn[eBF
h
]hγn(
1−
[ eAN
1− h
](1−h)(1−γ)n[eAF
h
]h(1−γ)n)
The same is true in occupation B, that is µBAN = µ
BA
F .
Proof: similar to lemma 1.
Lemma 2 shows that if there are no differences in the composition of social networks between
native and foreign workers and everyone has a population fraction h of foreign friends and 1−h
of native friends in the network, then there are no differences in the mismatch transition rates
between the two ethnic groups.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this subsection we analyze the dynamics of unemployment and matched employment for all
worker groups and characterize the steady state of the model. The dynamics of unemployment
uAN and matched employment m
A
N for native type A workers can be written as:
u˙AN = δN (1− h− u
A
N )− u
A
N (λN + µ
AA
N + µ
AB
N )
m˙AN = (λN + µ
AA
N )u
A
N − δNm
A
N
Here δN (1 − h − u
A
N ) corresponds to employed type A workers losing jobs at rate δN , so it is
the inflow into unemployment for native type A workers. At the same time the term uAN (λN +
µAAN + µ
AB
N ) is the outflow of these workers from unemployment. It reflects the fact that there
are three possibilities of finding a job: by means of a formal application at rate λN and with
a help of friends/relatives at rate µAAN + µ
AB
N . In the second equation the term (λN + µ
AA
N )u
A
N
corresponds to native type A workers finding jobs in their primary occupation, while δNm
A
N is
the outflow of workers from this group due to job losses.
We have two similar equations for foreign workers:
u˙AF = δF (h− u
A
F )− u
A
F (λF + µ
AA
F + µ
AB
F ) = 0
m˙AF = (λF + µ
AA
F )u
A
F − δFm
A
F = 0
In the steady state the outflow of workers from a given state should be equal to the inflow of
workers into this state, so we set u˙AN = 0, m˙
A
N = 0, u˙
A
F = 0 and m˙
A
F = 0. So the steady-state
distributions of workers across the three states are given by:
uAF =
δFh
δF + λF + µAAF + µ
AB
F
mAF =
(λF + µ
AA
F )h
δF + λF + µAAF + µ
AB
F
xAF = h− u
A
F −m
A
F
(1)
uAN =
δN (1− h)
δN + λN + µAAN + µ
AB
N
mAN =
(λN + µ
AA
N )(1− h)
δN + λN + µAAN + µ
AB
N
xAN = 1− h− u
A
N −m
A
N
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Consider the simplified case without ethnic homophily, that is τ = h. From lemmas 1 and 2 we
know that the network transition rates in this case are the same for native and foreign workers,
so that µAA = µAAN = µ
AA
F and µ
AB = µABN = µ
AB
F . From the empirical evidence presented
in section 2 we also know that foreign workers rely more often on their social networks when
searching for jobs, so the fraction of network hires is higher for foreign workers:
RN =
(µAA + µAB)
(λN + µAA + µAB)
<
(µAA + µAB)
(λF + µAA + µAB)
= RF
In our model we can capture this evidence by setting λN > λF . Intuitively, this means the
following. If foreign workers face larger difficulties in the formal job search then referrals via
social networks become a more important employment generating channel for foreign workers
compared to natives. Several explanations for λN > λF could be that there is more uncertainty
associated with foreign training and education, worse language proficiency of foreigners and/or
discrimination against ethnic minorities. Next we compare the mismatch rates of the two worker
groups and see that:
xAN
1− h
=
µAB
δN + λN + µAA + µAB
<
xAF
h
=
µAB
δF + λF + µAA + µAB
if δN + λN > δF + λF
This condition requires that δF − δN < λN − λF . Thus if the difference in the job destruction
rates is not too large, then our model predicts higher mismatch rates of foreign workers compared
to natives. There are two underlying processes that generate this prediction. On the one hand,
empirical evidence from section 2 shows that network referrals are more important for foreign
workers compared to natives. On the other hand, we incorporate the empirical evidence from
Bentolila et al. (2010) that referral hiring leads more often to mismatch jobs compared to the
formal search channel. Our model shows that a combination of these processes leads to the fact
that foreign workers are more often mismatched in the equilibrium than native workers.
The above prediction is derived for the special case when τ = h. In order to understand
the situation in the more realistic case with ethnic homophily in the next subsection we set
parameters to those observed in the German data and perform a detailed numerical analysis of
model properties.
3.4 Numerical results
In this subsection we analyze model predictions in the more general case when social networks
exhibit some degree of ethnic homophily. For this purpose we choose values of the exogenous
parameters inline with existing empirical research. We also target several empirical variables
reported in section 2. Given that the two sectors are symmetric we set v = vA = vB. Further
note that the search intensity of firms s and the vacancy rate v are inseparable in the model
and can only be determined as a product sv. From now on we consider sv as a single param-
eter. With this simplification the vector of exogenous parameters used in the model includes
{λN , λF , δN , δF , sv, τ, γ, n, h}.
Iftikhar and Zaharieva (2019) analyzed the size of foreign population in Germany over the
period 2005-2016. They find that even though the fraction of foreign citizens was below 10% in
Germany in this period, the fraction of individuals with immigration background was 18.2% in
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2005 and it increased to 19.7% in 2013. Given that social networks are likely to evolve along
the ethnic background rather than formal citizenship we set h = 0.2. Further this study shows
that the average job duration of native workers in Germany was stable in the considered period
and equal to 12 years. Given that the standard time unit in search and matching models is 1
quarter, we set δN = 0.02, which corresponds to the average job duration of native workers equal
to 1/0.02 = 50 quarters. The average job duration for immigrant workers is substantially lower
and close to 10 years. So we set δF = 0.03 to capture the difference. Intuitively, this means that
the jobs of foreign and immigrant workers are less stable compared to native workers.
We do not observe the size and homophily of social networks in labour market statistics.
Cingano and Rosolia (2012) report that the median number of social connections between in-
dividuals in Italy is about 32. Glitz (2017) reports a comparable number for Germany with
approximately 43 social contacts. In related theoretical studies Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2017)
use 40 as the average network size, while it is 50 in Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). Zaharieva (2018)
shows that the optimal diversification of social networks between two occupations strongly de-
pends on the unemployment benefits and the mismatch wage relative to the wage in the primary
occupation. Lower unemployment benefits and higher mismatch wages make social contacts
outside the primary occupation more valuable and the optimal homophily parameter is low and
close to 0.6 in this case. For this study we set n = 30 and γ = 0.6 as a starting point of the
numerical investigation but we also perform comparative statics analysis with respect to both
parameters and summarize the implications of the model for γ ∈ [0.5..1] and n ∈ [30..50].
In order to determine the remaining 4 parameters {λN , λF , sv, τ} we use our results from
section 2 and target the following 4 endogenous variables: uN/(1 − h) = 0.052, uF /h = 0.094,
RN = 0.297 and RF = 0.370. Due to the symmetry assumption we use the same values in both
occupations. These endogenous variables show that the unemployment rate of foreign/migrant
workers is higher than the unemployment rate of native workers. Moreover, native workers rely
less often on their social networks. Recall that Rj , j = N,F is the fraction of referral hires out
of new matches, which is given by:
RN =
(µAAN + µ
AB
N )u
A
N
(λN + µAAN + µ
AB
N )u
A
N
RF =
(µAAF + µ
AB
F )u
A
F
(λF + µAAF + µ
AB
F )u
A
F
Using these two expressions and equations (1) for the equilibrium unemployment rates we find
values of parameters {λN , λF , sv, τ} summarized in table 5.
Table 5: Exogenous parameters and target variables
Parameter Value Target and Source
λN 0.256 Unemployment rate uN/(1− h) = 0.052, GSOEP
λF 0.182 Unemployment rate uF /h = 0.094, GSOEP
sv 0.008 Fraction of network hires RN = 0.297, GSOEP
τ 0.290 Fraction of network hires RF = 0.370, GSOEP
We can see that λN = 0.256 > λF = 0.182. This means that small differences in the job
destruction rates between native and foreign workers (δN = 0.02 < δF = 0.03) are alone not
sufficient to generate empirically observed differences in the unemployment rates between these
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two groups. So we can conclude that higher unemployment rates of foreign and immigrant
workers in Germany are not only due to the lower stability of jobs occupied by the latter group
but also due to lower chances of being hired upon a formal application. This result is inline
with the experimental evidence presented in Kaas and Manger (2012). Moreover, we can see
that τ = 0.290 > h = 0.2. This means that social networks compatible with empirical evidence
exhibit a moderate degree of ethnic homophily in Germany. Note that the average fraction of
foreigners in the networks of native workers is h(1 − τ)/(1 − h) = 0.1775, that is 17.75%. The
equilibrium values of endogenous variables for our parameter choices are presented in table 6.
Table 6: Equilibrium values of endogenous variables
Native workers Foreign workers
Variable Value Variable Value Variable Value Variable Value
uAN/(1− h) 0.052 µ
AA
N 0.086 u
A
F /h 0.094 µ
AA
F 0.085
mAN/(1− h) 0.891 µ
AB
N 0.022 m
A
F /h 0.838 µ
AB
F 0.022
xAN/(1− h) 0.057 R
A
N 0.297 x
A
F /h 0.068 R
A
F 0.370
Table 6 shows that the mismatch probability of natives xAN/(1 − h) is equal to 5.7% and it
is lower compared to 6.8% for foreign workers. This numerical finding confirms our previous
prediction that larger dependence of foreign workers on their social networks leads to more
frequent mismatch of foreigners. We have already shown this in the special case when τ = h
but it also holds in the more realistic case with ethnic homophily (τ > h). In the next step we
perform comparative statics analysis with respect to the compound parameter sv. Parameter s
is driving the intensity of referral hiring in the model, if s = 0 firms don’t use referrals to hire
workers, in contrast, when s is large referral hiring dominates the formal search channel.
Figure 3: Left panel: Unemployment rates of native and foreign workers (uN/(1−h) and uF /h)
in the benchmark setting. Right panel: Fractions of network hires for native and foreign workers
(RN and RF ) in the benchmark setting
Our results are presented on figure 3. The left panel shows changes in the unemployment
22
rates of the two ethnic groups. Finding jobs becomes easier for both groups when s is increasing.
For example, both unemployment rates are two times smaller when sv = 0.015 compared to the
case without referral hiring sv = 0. Even though the relative change is similar, the absolute
drop in the unemployment rate of foreign workers is more pronounced compared to natives. The
right panel of this figure shows changes in the fraction of referral hires RN and RF . Since formal
applications of foreign workers are less successful compared to natives (λF < λN ) informal hiring
via networks becomes more important for foreigners. So we can see that RF > RN for all realistic
values of sv. To some extent referral hiring is a channel compensating the disadvantaged group
for lower employment chances associated with formal applications.
Figure 4: Left panel: Mismatch rates of native and foreign workers (xAN/(1 − h) and x
A
F /h),
benchmark. Right panel: Mismatch rates of native and foreign workers (xAN/(1− h) and x
A
F /h)
for different values of δF
The left panel of figure 4 shows changes in the mismatch rates of the two ethnic groups.
The fraction of mismatched foreign workers is higher than the fraction of mismatched native
workers for all values of sv and the relative difference is increasing with more intensive referral
hiring. Note that both rates start at zero, this is due to the normalization of mismatch to 0 in
the absence of network hiring.
In section 3.3 we considered a simplified case without ethnic homophily and proved that
foreign workers are more often mismatched if δF − δN < λN − λF . Note that this condition
holds for the chosen parameter values. In order to understand the importance of this condition
also in the more general case of ethnic homophily we increase parameter δF and illustrate the
corresponding changes in both mismatch rates on the right panel of figure 4. We can see that
with extreme values of δF the model may generate situations when the mismatch rate of native
workers is higher than the mismatch of foreigners. If δF is extremely high than the jobs of
foreign workers are very unstable and their unemployment rate is increasing very rapidly with
the higher job destruction rate. In this situation very few foreign workers are employed in
matched or mismatched employment as most of them are unemployed, so it may even happen
that native workers are more often mismatched. However, this situation is not compatible with
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the realistic parameter values of δF .
Finally, we perform comparative statics analysis with respect to parameters γ and n since
our empirical data is not sufficient to determine their values. Our results are illustrated on figure
5. We can see that the gap in the mismatch rates of foreign and native workers is decreasing
with higher values of occupation homophily γ. This is intuitive since higher values of γ imply
larger occupational segregation of workers, so the mismatch rates of both groups decrease and
fall down to 0 when γ = 1. This is the case of complete occupational segregation. At the same
time changes in the size of social networks n don’t have strong implications for the relative
difference in the mismatch rates of the two worker groups.
Figure 5: Left panel: Mismatch rates of native and foreign workers for different values of γ.
Right panel: Mismatch rates of native and foreign workers for different values of n
To sum up, our theoretical analysis suggests that stronger reliance of foreign workers on
referral hiring could be one of the reasons contributing to stronger occupational mismatch of
foreigners compared to native workers. In the next section we continue our empirical analysis
and test this theoretical prediction. We also test the underlying assumption of our model that
referral hiring generates more occupational mismatch than formal search methods suggested by
Bentolila et al. (2010).
4 Empirical testing
In this section we estimate the probabilities of occupational mismatch for different worker groups
and discuss our findings. The main goal of our empirical analysis is to find answers to the
following questions. Do the social networks generate more occupational mismatch compared to
the formal search channels? Are foreign workers more likely to be mismatched compared to
German workers? If yes, how much of the gap in mismatch rates between the two groups can
be explained by stronger utilization of social networks by foreign workers?
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4.1 Estimation of occupational mismatch
First, let us define occupational mismatch. The respondents who found their current job within
the previous two years answer the question if they were educated of trained for their current
position. The corresponding binary variable MATCHi,t takes value 1, if the i
th person answers
that his or her position is the same as the profession for which he or she was educated or trained,
thus the person is considered to be well matched. MATCHi,t takes value 0, if the i
th respondent
is mismatched at time t. The respondents who are currently in training or have no previous
training, are dropped from the sample. As a result descriptive statistics presented in Table 7
below is slightly different from the descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 7 shows that foreign citizens are 15.51% more likely
to be mismatched compared to German citizens. Furthermore, 56.33% of direct migrants are
mismatched, while 42.00% of German nationals and 42.34% of indirect migrants are mismatched.
The numbers for referral hiring have slightly changed due to the smaller sample size compared
to section 2 but the qualitative conclusion is the same. So, migrants are more likely to find a
job through referrals, and to be mismatched.
Next we investigate the job search channels in more details. The categorical variable CHANi,t
shows the channel through which individual i found his or her current job at time t. Workers are
considered to have found their job through public employment agency if they respond that they
found their current job through Employment Office, Job-Center, or Personal Service Agentur.
They are considered to have found their job through other search channels if they respond that
they found their current job by applying on chance, returned to former employer, or found a
job through other search channels. The corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 7. This table shows that referral hiring is a single most import search channel generating
jobs in Germany, followed by newspapers, public employment agencies and direct applications
in internet.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of MATCHi,t, REFi,t, and
CHANi,t by citizenship\migration background.
German Foreign German Direct Indirect Overall
citizens citizens national migrants migrants
MATCH
Yes 57.56% 42.05% 58.00% 43.67% 57.66% 56.56%
No 42.44% 57.95% 42.00% 56.33% 42.34% 43.44%
REF
Formal channels 69.57% 58.05% 70.07% 59.14% 67.54% 68.82%
Referrals 30.43% 41.95% 29.93% 40.86% 32.46% 31.18%
CHAN
Public emp. agency 9.41% 10.73% 9.46% 10.68% 8.24% 9.50%
Private emp. agency 1.27% 1.66% 1.21% 1.92% 1.45% 1.30%
Newspaper 12.65% 14.15% 12.72% 13.11% 12.50% 12.74%
Internet 7.90% 4.59% 7.74% 7.03% 7.95% 7.68%
Referrals 30.43% 41.95% 29.93% 40.86% 32.46% 31.18%
Other 38.34% 26.93% 38.94% 26.41% 37.40% 37.59%
Observations 14754 1025 13183 1564 1032 15779
Percentage 93.50% 6.50% 83.55% 9.91% 6.54% 100%
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Descriptive statistics for the control variables are presented in Table 15 in Appendix III.
Besides statistics about the overall sample, Table 15 includes descriptive statistics separately
for German citizens, foreign citizens, German nationals, direct and indirect migrants, to better
understand the differences between these groups.
Table 8 shows that for all worker groups referrals lead most often to mismatch compared to
all other search channels. Moreover, finding a job through the public employment agency leads
to the second lowest percentage of good matches among the search channels. In contrast, finding
a job through internet leads to the lowest percentage of mismatches for all the groups except
indirect migrants. To sum up, our descriptive statistics shows that foreign citizens are more
likely to be mismatched compared to German citizens, and compared to other search channels,
referrals lead more often to occupational mismatch. Also, referrals reduce the probability of a
good match for all groups, but relatively more so for foreign citizens.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of MATCHi,t by search chan-
nels for different worker groups.
Public Private Newspaper Internet Referrals Other Formal Referrals Overall
emp. agency emp. agency channels
MATCH
Yes 47.97% 55.12% 53.61% 68.56% 46.46% 65.69% 61.13% 46.46% 56.56%
No 52.03% 44.88% 46.39% 31.44% 53.54% 34.31% 38.87% 53.54% 43.44%
MATCH: German citizens
Yes 48.52% 55.85% 54.07% 68.58% 47.73% 66.53% 61.87% 47.73% 57.56%
No 51.48% 44.15% 45.93% 31.42% 52.27% 33.47% 38.13% 52.27% 42.44%
MATCH: Foreign citizens
Yes 40.91% 47.06% 47.59% 68.09% 33.26% 48.55% 48.40% 33.26% 42.05%
No 59.09% 52.94% 52.41% 31.91% 66.74% 34.31% 51.60% 66.74% 57.95%
MATCH: German nationals
Yes 48.44% 53.75% 54.44% 69.61% 48.18% 66.86% 62.20% 48.18% 58.00%
No 51.56% 46.25% 45.56% 30.39% 51.82% 33.14% 37.80% 51.82% 42.00%
MATCH: Direct migrants
Yes 40.72% 53.33% 44.88% 63.64% 35.68% 50.61% 49.19% 35.68% 43.67%
No 59.28% 46.67% 55.12% 36.36% 64.32% 49.39% 50.81% 64.32% 56.33%
MATCH: Indirect migrants
Yes 55.29% 73.33% 56.59% 62.20% 46.87% 66.32% 62.84% 46.87% 57.66%
No 44.71% 26.67% 43.41% 37.80% 53.13% 33.68% 37.16% 53.13% 42.34%
Observations 1499 205 2011 1212 4920 5932 10859 4920 15779
Percentage 9.50% 1.30% 12.74% 7.68% 31.18% 37.59% 68.82% 31.18% 100%
Further, MATCHi,t is regressed sequentially on different control variables. As before we
conduct the likelihood-ratio test for each set of control variables. The corresponding regression
output and likelihood ratios are presented in table 95. The results of likelihood-ratio tests suggest
that among the control variables only the dummy variable indicating gender of the individual
should not be added to the regression equation. Our results reveal that higher education is
positively associated with the probability of a good match. At the same time we can see that
workers in smaller firms are more likely to perform a job corresponding to their initial training,
whereas workers in larger firms are more frequently mismatched. Furthermore, jobs obtained
5Table 16 presented in Appendix IV includes all the coefficients of control variables.
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after a long break are often associated with mismatch.
Table 9: Estimation results of occupational mismatch.
Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EDU 0.230∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(33.32) (33.05) (29.97) (28.08) (28.23) (27.87) (27.72) (12.48) (12.48)
AGE -0.0251∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0236∗∗∗ -0.0234∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗
(-15.85) (-16.04) (-13.91) (-14.07) (-13.90) (-14.15) (-13.95) (-13.95)
IND v v v v v v v
TOJCH(Reference: First job)
Job After Break -0.432∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
(-4.60) (-4.68) (-4.69) (-4.57) (-3.83) (-3.82)
Job With New Employer -0.179∗ -0.180∗ -0.194∗ -0.204∗ -0.171 -0.171
(-1.97) (-1.98) (-2.13) (-2.22) (-1.83) (-1.83)
Company Taken Over 0.761∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
(5.40) (5.48) (5.46) (5.42) (5.72) (5.71)
Changed Job, Same Firm 0.163 0.200 0.193 0.197 0.150 0.149
(1.54) (1.87) (1.80) (1.83) (1.37) (1.36)
FSIZE(Reference: GE 2000)
[1] LT 20 0.155∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(2.92) (3.24) (3.42) (6.52) (6.52)
[2] GE 20 LT 200 0.0266 0.0462 0.0569 0.166∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.50) (0.86) (1.06) (3.04) (3.04)
[3] GE 200 LT 2000 0.00808 0.0214 0.0250 0.0676 0.0676
(0.14) (0.37) (0.43) (1.14) (1.13)
STATE v v v v
Survey year t v v v
ISEI 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗
(21.02) (21.02)
FEMALE -0.00608
(-0.16)
Constant -2.649∗∗∗ -1.723∗∗∗ -1.430∗∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗ -1.306∗∗∗ -1.228∗∗∗ -1.326∗∗∗ -1.583∗∗∗ -1.579∗∗∗
(-30.21) (-16.52) (-12.42) (-8.42) (-8.60) (-7.84) (-8.08) (-9.45) (-9.27)
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0026 0.0002 0.0521 0.00 0.8761
Observations 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.070 0.085 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.097 0.118 0.118
Standard errors are in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In the next step, MIGi,t is added to the regression equation. The coefficients are presented
in Table 10 and the marginal effects are contained in squared brackets. Column (2) indicates
that the coefficient on MIGi,t is negative and statistically significant, this means that foreign
citizens are more likely to be mismatched inline with the descriptive statistics. The correspond-
ing marginal effect reveals that foreign workers have 10% lower probability of being well matched
in the job. This empirical evidence confirms our theoretical prediction from section 3. How-
ever, it is not only this negative link between being a foreigner and the probability of a good
match that we want to test, but the underlying mechanism of the model based on the search
channel. So we continue and add variable REFi,t to the regression equation in column (3). The
coefficient of REFi,t is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that workers hired
through referrals are more likely to be mismatched compared to those who are hired through
the formal channel. Thus our empirical data confirms the model by Bentolila et al. (2010) and
our assumption underlying the theoretical model in section 3.
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Note, that after adding REFi,t to the regression equation the coefficient on MIGi,t becomes
smaller in absolute value and the marginal effect of this variable is reduced from 10% down to
9.3%. Intuitively, this means the following. The fact that foreign workers rely more often on
referral hiring explains a part of the negative link (0.7%) between being a foreigner and the
probability of a good match. This result confirms the mechanism described by our theoretical
model. However, the coefficient onMIGi,t stays negative and statistically significant after adding
REFi,t. This indicates that there are also other important reasons for the higher probability of
mismatch in the group of foreign workers going beyond the search channel and not covered by
our model.
Next, we empirically check if the two search channels exhibit different efficiency rates when
used by different worker groups. Efficiency here refers to the probability of a good match. We
do so by adding an interaction term MIGi,t × REFi,t into the regression, see column (4). The
likelihood-ratio test suggests that MIGi,t × REFi,t should not be included into the regression
equation since this variable is not significant. This means that referrals have equally low efficiency
in generating good matches irrespective of the applicant’s ethnic belonging.
When CHANi,t is added to the regression equation instead of REFi,t, the results are the
following (see column (5)). The coefficients on REFi,t and MIGi,t are again negative and
statistically significant. As in the descriptive statistics, referrals lead most often to mismatch
compared to other search channels. Other search channels which are positively associated with
mismatch are newspapers and the public employment agency. When we use detailed information
about the search channel we can see that the marginal effect of variable MIG is reduced even
further from 9.3% down to 9%. This means the following. The fact that foreign workers rely
more often on newspapers and the public employment agency explains another 0.3% difference
in the probability of mismatch between native and foreign workers. In specification (6) we
additionally include the interaction terms between MIGi,t and CHANi,t, but none of these
interaction terms is statistically significant. Moreover, the likelihood-ratio test suggests that
the interaction terms should not be included to the regression equation. Again this shows that
different search channels have similar match qualities when used by native and foreign workers.
It is rather so that foreign workers are more likely to rely on search channels with lower efficiency,
like referral hiring and employment agency.
Table 10: Estimation results of occupational mismatch by
citizenship and search channels.
Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MIG -0.400∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ 0.0144
[-0.099] [-0.093] [-0.092] [-0.090] [0.003]
REF -0.422∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗
[-0.103] [-0.103]
MIG × REF -0.00707
[-0.002]
CHAN (Reference: Internet)
Public emp. agency -0.325∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗
[-0.078] [-0.076]
Private emp. agency -0.258 -0.252
[-0.062] [-0.060]
Continued on next page
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Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper -0.235∗∗ -0.233∗∗
[-0.056] [-0.056]
Referrals -0.530∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗
[-0.129] [-0.125]
Other 0.017 0.0428
[0.004] [0.010]
MIG × CHAN(Reference: MIG × Internet)
MIG × Public empl. agency -0.296
[-0.072]
MIG × Private empl. agency -0.267
[-0.065]
MIG × Newspaper -0.196
[-0.048]
MIG × Referrals -0.397
[-0.097]
MIG × Other -0.551
[-0.134]
Control variables v v v v v v
Time FE v v v v v v
Constant -1.583∗∗∗ -1.480∗∗∗ -1.285∗∗∗ -1.285∗∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗ -1.136∗∗∗
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.00 0.00 0.9612 0.00 0.5276
Observations 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.119 0.125 0.125 0.127 0.127
Marginal effects are in squared brackets. Marginal effects for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Control variables in table 10 include age, education, industry, Standard International Socio-
Economic Index of Occupational Status of individuals, firm size with 4 categories, state of
residence, survey year, and the type of job change.6
In Table 11 we substitute binary variableMIGi,t with a more detailed variableMIGBACKi,t
containing three categories. Column (2) shows that the coefficient for direct migrants is neg-
ative and statistically significant, while the coefficient for indirect migrants is not statistically
significant. This means that compared to German nationals direct migrants are less likely to be
well matched, while indirect migrants can not be statistically distinguished from native German
workers. The marginal effect shows that direct migrants are 8.7% more likely to be mismatched
than German nationals. Next, REFi,t is added to the regression in column (3). The negative and
statistically significant coefficient of referrals suggests that referral hiring leads to good matches
less often compared to hiring through formal search channels. We can see that the marginal
effect is again reduced from 8.7% down to 8%. This confirms our earlier conclusion that 0.7%
of the differences in mismatch rates between migrant and native workers is due to the fact that
migrants rely more often on their social networks. Now we can additionally conclude that this
effect is largely generated by direct migrants. The interaction terms in column (4) are again
insignificant.
Further, we include a more detailed variable CHANi,t instead of a binary indicator REFi,t for
the search channel. The marginal effect of being a direct migrant falls from 8% down to 7.7%, so
this regression confirms the fact that additional 0.3% difference in the probabilities of mismatch
6Table 17 presented in Appendix V includes all the coefficients of control variables.
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is due to the fact that direct migrants use less efficient search channels such as newspapers and
services of the public employment agency more often than native German workers. At this step
we decided not to include the interaction terms between the search channels and MIGBACKi,t
as none of the interaction terms was significant in the previous regressions.
Table 11: Estimation results of occupational mismatch using
migration background and search channels.
Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MIGBACK (Reference: German national)
Direct migrant -0.351∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗
[-0.087] [-0.080] [-0.079] [-0.077]
Indirect migrant -0.120 -0.110 -0.122 -0.106
[-0.029] [-0.027] [-0.030] [-0.026]
Referrals -0.420∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗
[-0.103] [-0.103]
MIGBACK × REF (Reference: German national × Formal channels)
Direct migrant × referrals -0.00752
[-0.002]
Indirect migrant × referrals 0.0370
[0.009]
Chan (Reference: Internet)
Public emp. agency -0.329∗∗∗
[-0.079]
Private emp. agency -0.255
[-0.061]
Newspaper -0.243∗∗
[-0.058]
Referrals -0.534∗∗∗
[-0.130]
Other 0.00896
[0.002]
Control variables v v v v v
Time FE v v v v v
Constant -1.583∗∗∗ -1.485∗∗∗ -1.293∗∗∗ -1.293∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.00 0.00 0.9666 0.00
Observations 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.119 0.125 0.125 0.127
Marginal effects are in parentheses. Marginal effects for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Control variables in Table 11 include age, education, industry, Standard International Socio-
Economic Index of Occupational Status of individuals, firm size with 4 categories, state of
residence, survey year, and the type of job change.7
4.2 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
In the previous subsection we found that search channels have a significant effect on the proba-
bility of being well matched. Also, the probability of being well matched is different for German
7Table 18 presented in Appendix VI includes all the coefficients of control variables.
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and foreign citizens. The goal of this section is to quantify how much of the difference in mis-
match rates between the two groups can be explained by differences in the search channels. For
this purpose we use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition applied to the linear probability model
of the outcome variable MATCHi,t
8. This decomposition is based on the following equation:
YˆN − YˆF = (X¯N − X¯F )
′BˆN︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endowment effect (explained)
+ X¯ ′F (BˆN − BˆF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Coefficient effect (unexplained)
(2)
Here YˆN is the estimated proportion of well matched German citizens, and YˆF is the es-
timated proportion of well matched foreign citizens. X¯N and X¯F are the vectors of average
characteristics (endowments) of German and foreign citizens respectively. BˆN and BˆF are the
estimated coefficient vectors for the two groups. Note, that in the above-mentioned two-fold
decomposition the coefficients of the majority group are assumed to be nondiscriminatory. The
first element on the right-hand side shows differences in the proportions of well matched workers
stemming from different endowments of the two worker groups. This includes observable individ-
ual characteristics, such as education, gender and age, but also the search channel. The second
element on the right-hand side shows remaining differences in the proportions of well-matched
workers which can not be explained by the regression.
The estimation results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition are presented in Table 12.
Table 12: Estimation results of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by citizenship.
Coefficient Std.Err. Coefficient Std.Err.
German citizens 0.5756∗∗∗ 0.0041 German citizens 14754
Foreign citizens 0.4205∗∗∗ 0.0157 Foreign citizens 1022
Difference 0.1551∗∗∗ 0.0163 Observations 15776
Endowment effect 0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0067 Coefficient effect 0.0796∗∗∗ 0.0151
Public emp. ag. 0.00031 0.00028 Public emp. ag. 0.00028 0.00490
Private emp. ag. 0.00002 0.00011 Private emp. ag. 0.00027 0.00164
Newspapers 0.00004 0.00017 Newspapers -0.00318 0.00588
Internet 0.00143∗∗ 0.00053 Internet -0.00349 0.00296
Referrals 0.00760∗∗∗ 0.00146 Referrals 0.00535 0.01370
Other 0.00614∗∗∗ 0.00128 Other 0.01801 0.00982
Firm size -0.00428 0.00122 Firm size -0.00470 0.00644
Industry 0.00984∗∗∗ 0.00258 Industry 0.07943 0.05027
TOJCH 0.00336 0.00152 TOJCH 0.04663∗ 0.02383
State -0.00566∗ 0.00257 State -0.04982 0.03364
Time 0.00017 0.00119 Time -0.00308 0.00690
Education 0.02558∗∗∗ 0.00293 Education -0.02489 0.08296
Age -0.00592∗∗∗ 0.00177 Age -0.08710 0.05564
ISEI 0.03697∗∗∗ 0.00354 ISEI -0.08702∗ 0.04400
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The estimated fraction of well matched German citizens is 57.56%, and the estimated fraction of
well matched foreign citizens is 42.05%. So the difference is equal to 15.51%. We already know
these numbers from Table 7. The decomposition shows that the endowment effect is equal to
8Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was conducted using ”oaxaca” command in the statistical program Stata. See
details at Jann et al. (2008).
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7.56%, while the unexplained coefficient effect is 7.96%. Thus our regression can explain roughly
a half of the observable difference in the mismatch rates between foreign and German workers.
We can see that two variables that explain the largest part of the gap in mismatch rates
are education and the ISEI index of occupational prestige. This means that foreign workers in
Germany are less educated on average, and overrepresented in low skill jobs with low occupational
prestige. At the same time these jobs are associated with higher mismatch probability compared
to high skill jobs with high occupational prestige. Combined together these effects explain
2.6% + 3.7% = 6.3% out of the endowment effect equal to 7.6%. This effect is reduced by 0.6%
because German workers are older on average and the probability of mismatch is increasing with
age. At the same time foreign workers are overrepresented in industries with higher occupational
mismatch (such as transportation and trade), which explains another 1% of the endowment
effect. So the part of the endowment effect which is due to differences in the industry and
observable worker characteristics can be estimated as 6.7/7.6 = 88.2%. Finally, Table 12 shows
that additional 0.9% of the endowment effect are explained by the fact that foreign workers use
less efficient search channels compared to German workers. So the part of the endowment effect
which is due to the different search channels can be estimated as 0.9/7.6 = 11.8%. Note that
most of this effect is because of the more intensive referral hiring in the group of foreign workers
(0.76% out of 0.9) with only a small contribution of the internet (0.14 out of 0.9).
To conclude, first, both the estimations and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results show
that there is significant difference in the proportions of good matches between German citizens
and foreign citizens equal to 15.1%. Second, those who are matched through referrals are
more likely to be mismatched compared to those who are matched through formal channels.
Moreover, the results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition show that explanatory variables
used in the estimation account for about a half of the total gap in mismatch rates, which is the
endowment effect. And finally, the fact the foreign workers use less efficient search channels, such
as referral hiring, account for 11.8% of the endowment effect with the remaining gap attributed
to education, occupational prestige, age and industry differences.
5 Conclusion
In this study we investigate the link between the job search channels and occupational mismatch
with a specific focus on differences between native and immigrant workers. We use data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) over the period 2000-2014. First, we find that referral
hiring via social networks is the most frequent single channel of generating jobs in Germany.
Moreover, this channel is used more frequently by immigrant workers rather than natives. This
could be due to the higher risk of unemployment that immigrant workers are confronted with
and larger difficulties of finding jobs in a formal way. In this case social networks and referral
hiring serve as a channel of last resort for the immigrant population.
We combine this empirical evidence with the finding by Bentolila et al. (2010) that referral
hiring generates more occupational mismatch than formal search. The reason is that workers
tend to send formal applications to jobs in their primary occupation, whereas friends and relatives
providing job recommendations often work in different occupations giving rise to occupational
mismatch. We incorporate this empirical evidence into a search and matching model with two
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ethnic worker groups (natives and immigrants), two occupations and two search channels (formal
applications and informal network hiring). Job recommendations are given by employed workers
to the unemployed friends in their social network. We assume that all workers have the same size
of social networks, but their composition differs across groups. In particular, we take into account
that social networks exhibit ethnic and professional homophily meaning biased link formation
towards friends with the same ethnicity and from the same profession. Our model predicts
that more intensive utilisation of referal hiring leads to more frequent occupational mismatch
of immigrant workers. One condition for this result is that the gap in the job destruction rates
between native and immigrant workers is not too large which is satisfied for a realistic parameter
setting motivated by the data. From a theoretical perspective this result strongly depends on
the degree of professional homophily characterising social networks but it is not sensitive to the
network size.
Next we test the underlying assumption of the model and find empirical support for the fact
that referral hiring generates more occupational mismatch than formal search. The data reveals
that referral hiring is the least efficient job creating channel in terms of match quality among
public and private employment agencies, specialised newspapers, direct applications in internet
and other channels. Further, we test the theoretical prediction of our model that differences in
the incidence of referral hiring between native and immigrant workers contribute significantly
to the gap in mismatch rates between these groups. To achieve this goal we perform a Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition. The overall gap in the mismatch rates is equal to 15.5%. Roughly a
half of this effect (7.6%) can be explained by observable differences in the endowments between
native and immigrant workers including the search channel. We find that differences in the search
strategies explain about 1% of the gap in the mismatch rates. This effect is significant with the
remaining gap (6.6%) attributed to education, age and industry differences. This confirms our
theoretical prediction that at least a part of the mismatch gap between native and immigrant
workers is due to the less efficient job search channels used by immigrant workers.
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7 Appendix
Proof of lemma 1: Without ethnic homophily we know that nAAjN = (1− h)γn and n
AA
jF = hγn,
j = N,F . So variables MAANN and M
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FN can be reduced to:
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Further we can also rewrite variables MAANF and M
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FF as:
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F .
Appendix I. Estimation results: employment rates.
Table 13: Estimation results of employment rates, full table.
Variables Dependent variable: EMP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EDU 0.315∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(76.14) (76.09) (76.17) (76.99) (80.91) (80.81) (80.55) (75.31)
AGE 0.00225∗∗ 0.00225∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.00943∗∗∗ -0.00971∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗
(3.24) (3.25) (-13.46) (-11.28) (-11.56) (-18.52) (-20.06)
FEMALE -0.138∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(-8.71) (-6.59) (-6.86) (-6.98) (-7.37) (-8.09)
MARST(Reference: Married)
Continued on next page
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Variables Dependent variable: EMP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
[2] Single -0.867∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗ -0.774∗∗∗ -0.957∗∗∗ -1.003∗∗∗
(-39.95) (-34.43) (-34.54) (-39.67) (-41.38)
[3] Widowed -0.323∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
(-5.60) (-5.15) (-5.12) (-5.93) (-6.33)
[4] Divorced -0.770∗∗∗ -0.743∗∗∗ -0.747∗∗∗ -0.807∗∗∗ -0.839∗∗∗
(-32.41) (-30.85) (-30.94) (-33.04) (-34.18)
[5] Separated -0.752∗∗∗ -0.748∗∗∗ -0.748∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗ -0.815∗∗∗
(-16.98) (-16.62) (-16.60) (-17.70) (-17.94)
Number of -0.175∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
Children in HH (-20.25) (-19.22)
Foreign -0.652∗∗∗
citizen (-24.68)
STATE (Reference: Schleswig-Holstein)
[2] Hamburg 0.0557 0.0557 0.0475 0.129
(0.64) (0.64) (0.54) (1.46)
[3] Lower Saxony 0.202∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(3.73) (3.71) (3.82) (4.00)
[4] Bremen -0.437∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -0.434∗∗∗
(-4.65) (-4.65) (-4.83) (-4.60)
[5] North-Rhine 0.0425 0.0429 0.0376 0.0980∗
-Westfalia (0.86) (0.87) (0.76) (1.98)
[6] Hessen 0.267∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(4.63) (4.65) (4.47) (5.81)
[7] Rheinland-Pfalz 0.328∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(5.35) (5.37) (5.43) (5.83)
[8] Baden 0.586∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗
-Wuerttemberg (10.83) (10.85) (10.91) (13.14)
[9] Bavaria 0.618∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(11.77) (11.76) (11.58) (12.30)
[10] Saarland 0.259∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.228∗ 0.267∗∗
(2.82) (2.82) (2.48) (2.89)
[11] Berlin -0.599∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗ -0.555∗∗∗
(-10.26) (-10.24) (-10.28) (-9.45)
[12] Brandenburg -0.903∗∗∗ -0.903∗∗∗ -0.916∗∗∗ -0.933∗∗∗
(-16.34) (-16.34) (-16.53) (-16.84)
[13] Mecklenburg -0.854∗∗∗ -0.854∗∗∗ -0.870∗∗∗ -0.894∗∗∗
-Vorpommern (-13.97) (-13.96) (-14.17) (-14.57)
[14] Saxony -0.678∗∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -0.700∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗
(-12.95) (-12.95) (-13.34) (-13.74)
[15] Saxony-Anhalt -0.939∗∗∗ -0.941∗∗∗ -0.963∗∗∗ -0.985∗∗∗
(-17.05) (-17.07) (-17.44) (-17.84)
[16] Thuringia -0.717∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗ -0.741∗∗∗ -0.766∗∗∗
(-12.87) (-12.87) (-13.27) (-13.70)
Survey year t (Reference: 2000)
2001 -0.00268 0.000226 -0.000699
(-0.06) (0.01) (-0.02)
2002 -0.0289 -0.0264 -0.0326
(-0.65) (-0.59) (-0.73)
2003 -0.149∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(-3.39) (-3.28) (-3.45)
2004 -0.194∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(-4.40) (-4.32) (-4.49)
2005 -0.174∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(-3.87) (-3.83) (-3.96)
2006 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(-4.23) (-4.19) (-4.46)
2007 0.00179 0.00295 -0.00986
(0.04) (0.06) (-0.21)
2008 0.129∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.118∗
Continued on next page
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Variables Dependent variable: EMP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(2.65) (2.69) (2.42)
2009 0.0803 0.0861 0.0713
(1.69) (1.81) (1.49)
2010 -0.146∗∗∗ -0.0740 -0.0926∗
(-3.44) (-1.74) (-2.17)
2011 0.0131 0.0887∗ 0.0681
(0.30) (2.06) (1.57)
2012 0.0223 0.0986∗ 0.0796
(0.52) (2.28) (1.84)
2013 -0.0788 -0.00783 0.0347
(-1.94) (-0.19) (0.85)
2014 -0.0157 0.0551 0.0868∗
(-0.37) (1.28) (2.02)
Constant -1.311∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗∗ -1.349∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -1.115∗∗∗ -1.050∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.125
(-28.11) (-25.53) (-24.25) (-9.04) (-14.31) (-12.72) (-6.01) (-1.42)
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.0012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 213592 213592 213592 213592 213592 213592 213592 213592
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.081 0.116 0.117 0.120 0.125
Standard errors are in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Appendix II. Estimation results: referral hiring.
Table 14: Estimation results of referral hiring, full table.
Variables Dependent variable: REF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EDU -0.106∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.0988∗∗∗ -0.0798∗∗∗ -0.0707∗∗∗ -0.0641∗∗∗ -0.0643∗∗∗ -0.0649∗∗∗ -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0290∗∗∗
(-17.48) (-17.33) (-16.05) (-12.68) (-10.80) (-9.67) (-9.62) (-9.75) (-3.63) (-3.62)
AGE -0.00291∗ -0.00287∗ -0.00436∗∗ -0.00414∗∗ -0.00271 -0.00267 -0.00233 -0.00296 -0.00297
(-2.11) (-2.08) (-3.13) (-2.97) (-1.74) (-1.72) (-1.48) (-1.88) (-1.89)
Foreign 0.374∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗
citizen (6.67) (6.60) (6.38) (6.06) (5.78) (6.00) (5.77) (5.68)
FSIZE(Reference: GE 2000)
[1] LT 20 0.719∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(15.07) (14.67) (10.38) (10.37) (10.19) (9.01) (9.07)
[2] GE 20 LT
200
0.385∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.149∗∗
(7.82) (7.62) (3.84) (3.88) (3.65) (2.90) (2.88)
[3] GE 200 0.149∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.0410 0.0418 0.0352 0.0210 0.0190
LT 2000 (2.67) (2.89) (0.71) (0.73) (0.61) (0.36) (0.33)
IND(Reference: Services)
[1] Agriculture -0.0130 -0.0125 0.00331 0.00233 -0.102 -0.128
(-0.10) (-0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (-0.80) (-1.01)
[2] Energy -0.357 -0.300 -0.299 -0.273 -0.254 -0.274
(-1.78) (-1.46) (-1.46) (-1.33) (-1.24) (-1.33)
[3] Mining 0.420 0.552 0.538 0.515 0.490 0.451
(1.03) (1.31) (1.27) (1.21) (1.15) (1.06)
[4]
Manufacturing
0.152∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.119∗ 0.111∗ 0.0997∗ 0.0751
(3.12) (2.43) (2.40) (2.23) (2.01) (1.47)
[5]
Construction
0.0173 -0.0130 -0.00487 -0.0157 -0.0414 -0.0818
(0.33) (-0.24) (-0.09) (-0.30) (-0.77) (-1.44)
[6] Trade 0.226∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(5.18) (4.18) (4.21) (4.10) (4.30) (4.22)
[7] Transport 0.168∗ 0.138 0.142∗ 0.128 0.111 0.0816
Continued on next page
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Variables Dependent variable: REF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(2.39) (1.93) (1.98) (1.78) (1.54) (1.11)
[8]
Bank,Insurance
-0.205∗ -0.0971 -0.0978 -0.111 -0.0447 -0.0530
(-2.03) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.07) (-0.43) (-0.51)
TOJCH(Reference: First job)
Job After -0.278∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
Break (-4.67) (-4.66) (-5.29) (-5.73) (-5.61)
Job With New 0.129∗ 0.128∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.136∗ 0.135∗
Employer (2.39) (2.37) (2.73) (2.49) (2.48)
Company -1.527∗∗∗ -1.526∗∗∗ -1.529∗∗∗ -1.550∗∗∗ -1.555∗∗∗
Taken Over (-10.17) (-10.16) (-10.17) (-10.30) (-10.33)
Changed Job, -1.671∗∗∗ -1.672∗∗∗ -1.680∗∗∗ -1.669∗∗∗ -1.670∗∗∗
Same Firm (-15.09) (-15.09) (-15.15) (-15.04) (-15.05)
STATE(Reference: Schleswig-Holstein)
[2] Hamburg -0.00578
(-0.04)
[3] Lower -0.0863
Saxony (-0.80)
[4] Bremen -0.0680
(-0.33)
[5] North-Rhine -0.000841
-Westfalia (-0.01)
[6] Hessen -0.0279
(-0.25)
[7] Rheinland- -0.0504
Pfalz (-0.42)
[8] Baden- -0.0547
Wuerttemberg (-0.52)
[9] Bavaria -0.0266
(-0.26)
[10] Saarland 0.0321
(0.18)
[11] Berlin -0.00456
(-0.04)
[12]Brandenburg -0.0533
(-0.44)
[13]Mecklenburg -0.318∗
-Vorpommern (-2.24)
[14] Saxony -0.110
(-0.98)
[15] Saxony- -0.0240
Anhalt (-0.20)
[16] Thuringia 0.0714
(0.59)
Survey year t (Reference: 2000)
2001 -0.0160 -0.0135 -0.0131
(-0.22) (-0.18) (-0.18)
2002 -0.0761 -0.0720 -0.0700
(-0.98) (-0.92) (-0.90)
2003 0.0891 0.0956 0.0961
(1.11) (1.19) (1.20)
2004 -0.0186 -0.0178 -0.0200
(-0.23) (-0.22) (-0.25)
2005 0.0636 0.0653 0.0628
(0.78) (0.80) (0.77)
2006 0.00971 0.00428 0.00188
(0.12) (0.05) (0.02)
2007 0.210∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(2.71) (2.65) (2.65)
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Variables Dependent variable: REF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 0.150 0.145 0.145
(1.92) (1.85) (1.85)
2009 0.160∗ 0.163∗ 0.161∗
(2.06) (2.09) (2.07)
2010 -0.218∗∗ -0.224∗∗ -0.222∗∗
(-2.58) (-2.65) (-2.62)
2011 -0.150 -0.154 -0.151
(-1.73) (-1.76) (-1.73)
2012 -0.119 -0.132 -0.130
(-1.33) (-1.47) (-1.44)
2013 -0.163 -0.159 -0.156
(-1.81) (-1.76) (-1.73)
2014 -0.0529 -0.0680 -0.0595
(-0.69) (-0.89) (-0.77)
ISEI -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗
(-7.94) (-7.99)
FEMALE -0.0745∗
(-2.10)
Constant 0.580∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ -0.0279 -0.215∗ -0.0652 -0.0266 -0.0602 0.0143 0.0662
(7.64) (7.69) (6.26) (-0.28) (-1.97) (-0.58) (-0.18) (-0.50) (0.12) (0.53)
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.0344 0.00 0.0275 0.00 0.00 0.5708 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148 19148
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.028 0.030 0.058 0.058 0.060 0.062 0.062
Standard errors are in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Appendix III. Descriptive statistics of variables used as control variables.
Table 15: Descriptive statistics of control variables.
German Foreign German Direct Indirect Overall
citizens citizens nationals migrants migrants
EDU 12.92 11.65 12.96 12.01 12.57 12.84
AGE 35.15 36.26 36.42 37.33 31.59 36.19
IND
Agriculture 1.54% 1.85% 1.61% 1.53% 0.97% 1.56%
Energy 1.00% 0.29% 0.99% 0.58% 1.07% 0.95%
Mining 0.13% 0.20% 0.14% 0.13% 0.00% 0.13%
Manufacturing 13.98% 17.66% 13.66% 17.84% 15.79% 14.22%
Construction 11.89% 13.07% 11.86% 12.72% 12.11% 11.97%
Trade 17.43% 22.24% 17.33% 20.52% 18.80% 17.75%
Transport 5.68% 8.98% 5.49% 7.86% 8.04% 5.89%
Bank,Insurance 3.46% 1.85% 3.61% 1.41% 3.10% 3.36%
Services 44.90% 33.85% 45.30% 37.40% 40.12% 44.18%
TOJCH
First job 5.14% 4.98% 5.11% 4.54% 6.30% 5.13%
Job After Break 26.94% 29.66% 27.02% 29.92% 24.03% 27.11%
Job With New Employer 54.58% 54.05% 54.45% 57.67% 54.94% 54.80%
Company Taken Over 3.33% 3.12% 3.27% 2.81% 4.75% 3.32%
Changed Job, Same Firm 10.01% 4.20% 10.15% 5.05% 9.98% 9.63%
FSIZE
[1] LT 20 33.12% 38.44% 33.24% 36.13% 32.36% 33.47%
[2] GE 20 LT 200 29.77% 29.56% 29.65% 31.84% 28.00% 29.76%
[3] GE 200 LT2000 17.86% 16.00% 17.86% 16.11% 18.70% 17.74%
[4] GE 2000 19.24% 16.00% 19.25% 15.92% 20.93% 19.03%
STATE
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German Foreign German Direct Indirect Overall
citizens citizens nationals migrants migrants
[1] Schleswig-Holstein 2.95% 1.17% 3.01% 2.11% 1.65% 2.83%
[2] Hamburg 1.76% 0.68% 1.71% 1.02% 2.42% 1.69%
[3] Lower Saxony 9.36% 7.02% 9.33% 10.36% 5.91% 9.21%
[4] Bremen 0.83% 0.78% 0.74% 1.53% 0.78% 0.82%
[5] North-Rhine-Westfalia 18.34% 24.29% 17.79% 24.68% 21.71% 18.73%
[6] Hessen 7.45% 8.98% 7.15% 9.08% 10.27% 7.55%
[7] Rheinland-Pfalz 4.28% 4.78% 4.04% 6.01% 5.33% 4.32%
[8] Baden-Wuerttemberg 10.89% 23.41% 10.04% 18.73% 22.38% 11.71%
[9] Bavaria 14.38% 20.49% 14.36% 16.88% 16.96% 14.78%
[10] Saarland 0.92% 1.85% 0.83% 2.24% 1.07% 0.98%
[11] Berlin 3.86% 4.39% 3.85% 4.35% 3.78% 3.89%
[12] Brandenburg 4.75% 0.78% 5.11% 1.15% 1.74% 4.49%
[13] Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2.79% 0.20% 3.02% 0.19% 1.16% 2.62%
[14] Saxony 7.89% 0.88% 8.56% 1.02% 2.81% 7.43%
[15] Saxony-Anhalt 4.90% 0.00% 5.29% 0.32% 0.10% 4.58%
[16] Thuringia 4.66% 0.29% 5.19% 0.32% 0.10% 4.37%
Survey year t
2000 9.65% 13.85% 9.89% 10.81% 9.01% 9.92%
2001 8.17% 10.63% 8.32% 8.76% 7.75% 8.33%
2002 6.84% 8.10% 7.06% 6.14% 6.30% 6.92%
2003 6.01% 6.24% 6.09% 4.86% 6.88% 6.02%
2004 6.36% 5.76% 6.44% 6.27% 4.94% 6.32%
2005 5.96% 4.98% 5.99% 4.80% 6.30% 5.89%
2006 6.66% 5.56% 6.71% 5.88% 6.10% 6.59%
2007 7.16% 6.44% 7.15% 7.23% 6.59% 7.12%
2008 7.00% 5.85% 6.91% 6.65% 7.56% 6.93%
2009 7.14% 7.22% 7.07% 7.93% 6.88% 7.14%
2010 5.91% 5.27% 5.86% 5.63% 6.40% 5.87%
2011 5.63% 3.22% 5.48% 4.86% 6.40% 5.48%
2012 4.98% 3.32% 4.96% 3.90% 5.23% 4.87%
2013 5.04% 3.22% 4.99% 3.90% 5.52% 4.92%
2014 7.49% 10.34% 7.08% 12.40% 8.14% 7.67%
ISEI 45.51 39.02 45.72 39.38 45.69 45.09
Gender
Male 43.99% 54.34% 43.94% 46.68% 50.78% 44.66%
Female 56.01% 45.66% 56.06% 53.32% 49.22% 55.34%
Observations 14754 1025 13183 1564 1032 15779
Percentage 93.50% 6.50% 83.55% 9.91% 6.54% 100%
Appendix IV. Estimation results: occupational mismatch.
Table 16: Estimation results of occupational mismatch.
Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EDU 0.230∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(33.32) (33.05) (29.97) (28.08) (28.23) (27.87) (27.72) (12.48) (12.48)
AGE -0.0251∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0236∗∗∗ -0.0234∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗
(-15.85) (-16.04) (-13.91) (-14.07) (-13.90) (-14.15) (-13.95) (-13.95)
IND(Reference: Services)
Agriculture -0.223 -0.179 -0.207 -0.155 -0.152 0.136 0.133
(-1.65) (-1.31) (-1.51) (-1.12) (-1.10) (0.96) (0.94)
Energy -0.450∗∗ -0.512∗∗ -0.475∗∗ -0.469∗∗ -0.481∗∗ -0.571∗∗ -0.572∗∗
(-2.59) (-2.92) (-2.70) (-2.66) (-2.73) (-3.21) (-3.21)
Mining -0.932 -0.993∗ -0.960∗ -0.878 -0.874 -0.857 -0.860
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Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(-1.96) (-2.05) (-1.99) (-1.82) (-1.81) (-1.76) (-1.77)
Manufacturing -0.208∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗
(-4.03) (-4.23) (-3.83) (-4.04) (-3.82) (-3.30) (-3.24)
Construction 0.337∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(5.94) (6.00) (5.98) (6.25) (6.40) (7.53) (7.03)
Trade -0.418∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗
(-8.67) (-8.18) (-8.37) (-8.49) (-8.35) (-8.93) (-8.93)
Transport -0.862∗∗∗ -0.888∗∗∗ -0.876∗∗∗ -0.878∗∗∗ -0.870∗∗∗ -0.819∗∗∗ -0.821∗∗∗
(-11.41) (-11.64) (-11.44) (-11.44) (-11.33) (-10.58) (-10.44)
Bank,Insurance 0.234∗ 0.168 0.195 0.172 0.183 -0.0103 -0.0108
(2.30) (1.63) (1.88) (1.65) (1.76) (-0.10) (-0.10)
TOJCH(Reference: First job)
Job After Break -0.432∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
(-4.60) (-4.68) (-4.69) (-4.57) (-3.83) (-3.82)
Job With New -0.179∗ -0.180∗ -0.194∗ -0.204∗ -0.171 -0.171
Employer (-1.97) (-1.98) (-2.13) (-2.22) (-1.83) (-1.83)
Company Taken 0.761∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
Over (5.40) (5.48) (5.46) (5.42) (5.72) (5.71)
Changed Job, 0.163 0.200 0.193 0.197 0.150 0.149
Same Firm (1.54) (1.87) (1.80) (1.83) (1.37) (1.36)
FSIZE(Reference: GE 2000)
[1] LT 20 0.155∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(2.92) (3.24) (3.42) (6.52) (6.52)
[2] GE 20 LT 200 0.0266 0.0462 0.0569 0.166∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.50) (0.86) (1.06) (3.04) (3.04)
[3] GE 200 0.00808 0.0214 0.0250 0.0676 0.0676
LT 2000 (0.14) (0.37) (0.43) (1.14) (1.13)
STATE(Reference: Bavaria)
[1] Schleswig- -0.114 -0.117 -0.0471 -0.0473
Holstein (-1.03) (-1.05) (-0.42) (-0.42)
[2] Hamburg 0.0222 0.0158 -0.00693 -0.00733
(0.15) (0.11) (-0.05) (-0.05)
[3] Lower Saxony -0.0886 -0.0881 -0.0378 -0.0379
(-1.24) (-1.23) (-0.52) (-0.52)
[4] Bremen -0.125 -0.118 -0.135 -0.136
(-0.64) (-0.61) (-0.69) (-0.69)
[5] North-Rhine- -0.0487 -0.0410 0.00297 0.00275
Westfalia (-0.81) (-0.68) (0.05) (0.05)
[6] Hessen 0.0820 0.0809 0.0849 0.0846
(1.05) (1.03) (1.07) (1.07)
[7] Rheinland- -0.136 -0.145 -0.0889 -0.0888
Pfalz (-1.47) (-1.55) (-0.94) (-0.94)
[8] Baden- -0.0221 -0.0270 -0.0151 -0.0152
Wuerttemberg (-0.33) (-0.40) (-0.22) (-0.22)
[10] Saarland -0.327 -0.321 -0.313 -0.314
(-1.84) (-1.81) (-1.74) (-1.74)
[11] Berlin -0.155 -0.164 -0.119 -0.119
(-1.56) (-1.65) (-1.18) (-1.18)
[12] Brandenburg -0.374∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗ -0.265∗∗
(-4.07) (-3.97) (-2.84) (-2.84)
[13]Mecklenburg- -0.317∗∗ -0.311∗∗ -0.243∗ -0.244∗
Vorpommern (-2.80) (-2.74) (-2.11) (-2.12)
[14] Saxony -0.0300 -0.0331 0.0512 0.0508
(-0.39) (-0.43) (0.65) (0.65)
[15] Saxony- -0.202∗ -0.194∗ -0.0988 -0.0994
Anhalt (-2.21) (-2.13) (-1.06) (-1.07)
[16] Thuringia -0.266∗∗ -0.264∗∗ -0.140 -0.140
(-2.88) (-2.85) (-1.48) (-1.48)
Survey year t (Reference: 2000)
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Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2001 0.0702 0.0617 0.0616
(0.88) (0.76) (0.76)
2002 0.157 0.151 0.151
(1.86) (1.76) (1.76)
2003 0.0845 0.0647 0.0648
(0.96) (0.72) (0.73)
2004 0.0848 0.0933 0.0931
(0.97) (1.06) (1.05)
2005 0.145 0.130 0.129
(1.62) (1.43) (1.43)
2006 0.0291 0.0287 0.0285
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33)
2007 0.0721 0.0899 0.0900
(0.86) (1.05) (1.06)
2008 0.118 0.133 0.133
(1.38) (1.54) (1.54)
2009 0.238∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.232∗∗
(2.79) (2.69) (2.69)
2010 0.0437 0.0676 0.0679
(0.49) (0.74) (0.74)
2011 0.132 0.143 0.144
(1.43) (1.53) (1.54)
2012 0.239∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.284∗∗
(2.49) (2.91) (2.91)
2013 0.249∗∗ 0.233∗ 0.234∗
(2.60) (2.39) (2.40)
2014 0.268∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(3.21) (3.74) (3.75)
ISEI 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗
(21.02) (21.02)
FEMALE -0.00608
(-0.16)
Constant -2.649∗∗∗ -1.723∗∗∗ -1.430∗∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗ -1.306∗∗∗ -1.228∗∗∗ -1.326∗∗∗ -1.583∗∗∗ -1.579∗∗∗
(-30.21) (-16.52) (-12.42) (-8.42) (-8.60) (-7.84) (-8.08) (-9.45) (-9.27)
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0026 0.0002 0.0521 0.00 0.8761
Observations 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.070 0.085 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.097 0.118 0.118
Standard errors are in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Appendix V. Estimation results: occupational mismatch using citizenship and
search channels.
Table 17: Estimation results of occupational mismatch using
citizenship and search channels.
Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EDU 0.110∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
AGE -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗
(-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006)
IND(Reference: Services)
[1] Agriculture 0.136 0.145 0.141 0.141 0.133 0.138
(0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
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Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[2] Energy -0.571∗∗ -0.580∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗ -0.599∗∗∗
(-0.141) (-0.143) (-0.149) (-0.149) (-0.149) (-0.148)
[3] Mining -0.857 -0.842 -0.821 -0.821 -0.852 -0.850
(-0.211) (-0.207) (-0.202) (-0.202) (-0.210) (-0.209)
[4] Manufacturing -0.177∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗ -0.166∗∗ -0.166∗∗ -0.165∗∗ -0.163∗∗
(-0.043) (-0.042) (-0.040) (-0.040) (-0.040) (-0.039)
[5] Construction 0.443∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099)
[6] Trade -0.442∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ -0.424∗∗∗ -0.424∗∗∗ -0.432∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗
(-0.109) (-0.108) (-0.104) (-0.104) (-0.106) (-0.106)
[7] Transport -0.819∗∗∗ -0.807∗∗∗ -0.804∗∗∗ -0.804∗∗∗ -0.812∗∗∗ -0.812∗∗∗
(-0.202) (-0.199) (-0.198) (-0.198) (-0.200) (-0.200)
[8] Bank,Insurance -0.0103 -0.0140 -0.0253 -0.0253 -0.0260 -0.0258
(-0.002) (-0.003) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006)
TOJCH(Reference: First job)
Job After Break -0.370∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗
(-0.090) (-0.092) (-0.102) (-0.102) (-0.106) (-0.106)
Job With New Employer -0.171 -0.180 -0.171 -0.171 -0.170 -0.170
(-0.041) (-0.043) (-0.041) (-0.041) (-0.040) (-0.040)
Company Taken Over 0.822∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.167) (0.147) (0.147) (0.134) (0.135)
Changed Job, Same Firm 0.150 0.133 0.0345 0.0346 -0.0659 -0.0687
(0.035) (0.031) (0.008) (0.008) (-0.015) (-0.016)
FSIZE(Reference: GE 2000)
[1] LT 20 0.359∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.088) (0.098) (0.098) (0.102) (0.103)
[2] GE 20 LT 200 0.166∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.050)
[3] GE 200 LT 2000 0.0676 0.0682 0.0676 0.0676 0.0808 0.0821
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
STATE(Reference: Bavaria)
[1] Schleswig-Holstein -0.0471 -0.0741 -0.0647 -0.0647 -0.0658 -0.0669
(-0.011) (-0.018) (-0.016) (-0.016) (-0.016) (-0.016)
[2] Hamburg -0.00693 -0.0251 -0.0281 -0.0281 -0.0290 -0.0279
(-0.002) (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007)
[3] Lower Saxony -0.0378 -0.0550 -0.0577 -0.0577 -0.0623 -0.0619
(-0.009) (-0.013) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.015) (-0.015)
[4] Bremen -0.135 -0.148 -0.151 -0.151 -0.141 -0.145
(-0.033) (-0.036) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.034) (-0.035)
[5] North-Rhine-Westfalia 0.00297 0.000882 0.00462 0.00462 0.000943 0.000663
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
[6] Hessen 0.0849 0.0845 0.0848 0.0849 0.0739 0.0737
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
[7] Rheinland-Pfalz -0.0889 -0.0996 -0.0971 -0.0971 -0.102 -0.103
(-0.021) (-0.024) (-0.024) (-0.024) (-0.025) (-0.025)
[8] Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.0151 0.00362 -0.00112 -0.00113 -0.00236 -0.00215
(-0.004) (0.001) (-0.000) (-0.000) (-0.001) (-0.000)
[10] Saarland -0.313 -0.304 -0.297 -0.297 -0.305 -0.298
(-0.077) (-0.075) (-0.073) (-0.073) (-0.075) (-0.073)
[11] Berlin -0.119 -0.120 -0.117 -0.117 -0.119 -0.119
(-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.028) (-0.028) (-0.029) (-0.029)
[12] Brandenburg -0.265∗∗ -0.299∗∗ -0.301∗∗ -0.301∗∗ -0.297∗∗ -0.298∗∗
(-0.065) (-0.074) (-0.074) (-0.074) (-0.073) (-0.073)
[13] Mecklenburg- -0.243∗ -0.280∗ -0.292∗ -0.292∗ -0.283∗ -0.284∗
Vorpommern (-0.060) (-0.069) (-0.072) (-0.072) (-0.069) (-0.070)
[14] Saxony 0.0512 0.0165 0.0111 0.0111 0.0119 0.0106
(0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
[15] Saxony-Anhalt -0.0988 -0.136 -0.140 -0.140 -0.128 -0.129
(-0.024) (-0.033) (-0.034) (-0.034) (-0.031) (-0.031)
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Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[16] Thuringia -0.140 -0.177 -0.163 -0.163 -0.158 -0.159
(-0.034) (-0.043) (-0.040) (-0.040) (-0.039) (-0.039)
Survey year t (Reference: 2000)
2001 0.0617 0.0576 0.0519 0.0519 0.0537 0.0511
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
2002 0.151 0.147 0.138 0.138 0.127 0.125
(0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030)
2003 0.0647 0.0564 0.0571 0.0571 0.0533 0.0520
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
2004 0.0933 0.0822 0.0844 0.0844 0.0704 0.0695
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
2005 0.130 0.117 0.119 0.119 0.101 0.100
(0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025)
2006 0.0287 0.0177 0.0137 0.0137 -0.00251 -0.00315
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (-0.001) (-0.001)
2007 0.0899 0.0795 0.0947 0.0946 0.0746 0.0727
(0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018)
2008 0.133 0.121 0.130 0.130 0.109 0.107
(0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026)
2009 0.232∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.215∗ 0.213∗
(0.057) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.052)
2010 0.0676 0.0579 0.0296 0.0296 0.00378 0.00391
(0.017) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
2011 0.143 0.127 0.103 0.103 0.0666 0.0633
(0.035) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.0015)
2012 0.283∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.249∗ 0.249∗ 0.212∗ 0.214∗
(0.069) (0.065) (0.060) (0.060) (0.051) (0.052)
2013 0.233∗ 0.218∗ 0.201∗ 0.201∗ 0.165 0.165
(0.057) (0.053) (0.049) (0.049) (0.040) (0.040)
2014 0.317∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.265∗∗
(0.077) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.065) (0.064)
ISEI 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreign -0.400∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ 0.0144
citizen (-0.099) (-0.093) (-0.092) (-0.090) (0.003)
Referrals -0.422∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗
(-0.103) (-0.103)
Foreign citizen × -0.00707
Referrals (-0.002)
CHAN (Reference: Internet)
Public emp. agency -0.325∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗
(-0.078) (-0.076)
Private emp. agency -0.258 -0.252
(-0.062) (-0.060)
Newspaper -0.235∗∗ -0.233∗∗
(-0.056) (-0.056)
Referrals -0.530∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗
(-0.129) (-0.125)
Other 0.017 0.0428
(0.004) (0.010)
MIG × CHAN(Reference: Foreign citizen × Internet)
Foreign citizen × Public -0.296
emp. agency (-0.072)
Foreign citizen × Private -0.267
emp. agency (-0.065)
Foreign citizen × -0.196
Newspaper (-0.048)
Foreign citizen × Referrals -0.397
(-0.097)
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Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign citizen × Other -0.551
(-0.134)
Constant -1.583∗∗∗ -1.480∗∗∗ -1.285∗∗∗ -1.285∗∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗ -1.136∗∗∗
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.00 0.00 0.9612 0.00 0.5276
Observations 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.119 0.125 0.125 0.127 0.127
Marginal effects are in parentheses. Marginal effects for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Appendix VI. Estimation results: occupational mismatch using migration back-
ground and search channels.
Table 18: Estimation results of occupational mismatch using
migration background and search channels.
Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EDU 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
AGE -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗∗
(-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006)
IND(Reference: Services)
[1] Agriculture 0.136 0.138 0.135 0.135 0.127
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
[2] Energy -0.571∗∗ -0.575∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗
(-0.141) (-0.142) (-0.147) (-0.147) (-0.148)
[3] Mining -0.857 -0.857 -0.836 -0.836 -0.866
(-0.211) (-0.211) (-0.206) (-0.206) (-0.213)
[4] Manufacturing -0.177∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.161∗∗
(-0.043) (-0.041) (-0.039) (-0.039) (-0.039)
[5] Construction 0.443∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099)
[6] Trade -0.442∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗
(-0.109) (-0.108) (-0.104) (-0.104) (-0.106)
[7] Transport -0.819∗∗∗ -0.806∗∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗ -0.811∗∗∗
(-0.202) (-0.199) (-0.198) (-0.198) (-0.200)
[8] Bank,Insurance -0.0103 -0.0215 -0.0323 -0.0322 -0.0328
(-0.002) (-0.005) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008)
TOJCH(Reference: First job)
Job After Break -0.370∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗
(-0.090) (-0.092) (-0.102) (-0.102) (-0.106)
Job With New Employer -0.171 -0.184 -0.174 -0.174 -0.173
(-0.041) (-0.044) (-0.042) (-0.042) (-0.041)
Company Taken Over 0.822∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.166) (0.147) (0.147) (0.134)
Changed Job, Same Firm 0.150 0.129 0.0319 0.0319 -0.0657
(0.035) (0.030) (0.007) (0.007) (-0.015)
FSIZE(Reference: GE 2000)
[1] LT 20 0.359∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.087) (0.098) (0.098) (0.102)
[2] GE 20 LT 200 0.166∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
[3] GE 200 LT 2000 0.0676 0.0687 0.0681 0.0683 0.0812
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
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Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STATE(Reference: Bavaria)
[1] Schleswig-Holstein -0.0471 -0.0673 -0.0578 -0.0577 -0.0593
(-0.011) (-0.016) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014)
[2] Hamburg -0.00693 -0.0173 -0.0207 -0.0198 -0.0220
(-0.002) (-0.004) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005)
[3] Lower Saxony -0.0378 -0.0427 -0.0461 -0.0461 -0.0509
(-0.009) (-0.010) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.012)
[4] Bremen -0.135 -0.113 -0.119 -0.120 -0.110
(-0.033) (-0.027) (-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.027)
[5] North-Rhine-Westfalia 0.00297 0.0110 0.0140 0.0141 0.0100
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
[6] Hessen 0.0849 0.0939 0.0932 0.0932 0.0819
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
[7] Rheinland-Pfalz -0.0889 -0.0824 -0.0813 -0.0813 -0.0866
(-0.022) (-0.020) (-0.020) (-0.020) (-0.021)
[8] Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.0151 0.00864 0.00349 0.00373 0.00191
(-0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
[10] Saarland -0.313 -0.280 -0.274 -0.273 -0.282
(-0.077) (-0.069) (-0.067) (-0.067) (-0.069)
[11] Berlin -0.119 -0.116 -0.114 -0.114 -0.116
(-0.029) (-0.028) (-0.028) (-0.028) (-0.028)
[12] Brandenburg -0.265∗∗ -0.305∗∗ -0.306∗∗ -0.306∗∗ -0.302∗∗
(-0.065) (-0.075) (-0.075) (-0.075) (-0.074)
[13] Mecklenburg-Vorpommern -0.243∗ -0.289∗ -0.300∗∗ -0.300∗∗ -0.290∗
(-0.060) (-0.071) (-0.074) (-0.074) (-0.071)
[14] Saxony 0.0512 0.00759 0.00316 0.00324 0.00440
(0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[15] Saxony-Anhalt -0.0988 -0.143 -0.146 -0.146 -0.134
(-0.024) (-0.035) (-0.038) (-0.036) (-0.033)
[16] Thuringia -0.140 -0.190∗ -0.174 -0.174 -0.169
(-0.034) (-0.047) (-0.043) (-0.043) (-0.041)
Survey year t (Reference: 2000)
2001 0.0617 0.0611 0.0549 0.0548 0.0565
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
2002 0.151 0.146 0.138 0.138 0.126
(0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031)
2003 0.0647 0.0591 0.0594 0.0592 0.0555
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
2004 0.0933 0.0922 0.0932 0.0933 0.0788
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019)
2005 0.130 0.124 0.125 0.124 0.106
(0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026)
2006 0.0287 0.0259 0.0209 0.0207 0.00420
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
2007 0.0899 0.0894 0.104 0.103 0.0831
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.020)
2008 0.133 0.133 0.141 0.141 0.119
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.029)
2009 0.232∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.224∗
(0.057) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.054)
2010 0.0676 0.0682 0.0393 0.0393 0.0127
(0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003)
2011 0.143 0.143 0.118 0.118 0.0813
(0.035) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.020)
2012 0.283∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.221∗
(0.069) (0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.054)
2013 0.233∗ 0.229∗ 0.212∗ 0.212∗ 0.175
(0.057) (0.056) (0.052) (0.052) (0.043)
2014 0.317∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
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Variables Dependent variable: MATCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.077) (0.082) (0.079) (0.079) (0.069)
ISEI 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
MIGBACK (Reference: German national)
Direct migrant -0.351∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗
(-0.087) (-0.080) (-0.079) (-0.077)
Indirect migrant -0.120 -0.110 -0.122 -0.106
(-0.029) (-0.027) (-0.030) (-0.026)
Referrals -0.420∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗
(-0.103) (-0.103)
MIGBACK × REF (Reference: German national × Formal channels)
Direct migrant × referrals -0.00752
(-0.002)
Indirect migrant × referrals 0.0370
(0.009)
Chan (Reference: Internet)
Public emp. agency -0.329∗∗∗
(-0.079)
Private emp. agency -0.255
(-0.061)
Newspaper -0.243∗∗
(-0.058)
Referrals -0.534∗∗∗
(-0.130)
Other 0.00896
(0.002)
Constant -1.583∗∗∗ -1.485∗∗∗ -1.293∗∗∗ -1.293∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗
LR test(Prob> χ2) 0.00 0.00 0.9666 0.00
Observations 15779 15779 15779 15779 15779
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.119 0.125 0.125 0.127
Marginal effects are in parentheses. Marginal effects for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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